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The relationship between product market competition (PMC) and innovative activ-
ity has recently attracted the attention of many economists. Several signiﬁcant
contributions to both the Industrial Organization (IO) literature and the recent en-
dogenous growth theory have dealt with the issue of the eects of product market
competition on incentives to innovate. Although the standard IO theory as well as
the early endogenous growth models predict a negative relationship between compet-
ition and innovation, the empirical ﬁndings of e.g. Blundell et al. (1995, 1999) and
Nickell (1996) have raised the possibility of a positive correlation between product
market competition and productivity growth within a ﬁrm or an industry. These
empirical works have led to a new strand of literature where the disciplining eects of
competition are introduced into the Schumpeterian paradigm of endogenous growth
theory. Interactions between the disciplining eect of product market competition
and that of good corporate governance have also been considered in a few studies.
The reconciliation of the Schumpeterian growth paradigm with the evidence of
a positive relationship between product market competition and innovation has re-
vitalized endogenous growth theory and lead to implications for policy that point to
a need for reorganization of the R&D policy in most industrialized countries. Until
recently, R&D policy has focused largely on public intervention in the form of sub-
sidies to private R&D activity. The shared view between theorists and politicians has
been that technological advances result from purposive R&D activity. The driving
force of innovation is seen to be the reward in the form of post-innovation monopoly
power that accrues to an innovator. R&D policy has focused on subsidizing private
R&D activity and creating incentives through the protection of intellectual property
rights, in order to secure the post-innovation monopoly rents. Although, according
to the classical Schumpeterian view, economic rent created via market power is ne-
cessary for growth, the general view in economics is that monopoly power causesstatic (allocative) and dynamic (productive) ine!ciencies, which result in a welfare
loss (Motta, 2003).
In their elegant model, Aghion et al. (1992) show that growth is achieved through
quality improvements of the existing technology resulting from a stochastic innov-
ation process. Technological progress always contains a destructive side in that a
new innovation implies a switch of monopoly power to an entrant. This implies a
rather unrealistic market situation, where competing technologies cannot coexist,
as the new innovation always make the old technology obsolete. Another point of
criticism to the Schumpeterian paradigm is that the leapfrogging assumption (i.e.
the monopolist market being overtaken by an entrant) ﬁts poorly into the reality
of many turbulent high-tech industries, where innovations contain tacit knowledge.
The increasing amount of tacit knowledge attached to the technology makes imita-
tion complicated and thus it is impossible for an entrant to sidestep the monopolist
without breaking even.
In line with the above mentioned recent empirical ﬁndings of a positive rela-
tionship between productivity growth and product market competition, a more
gradualist approach to technological progress has been presented in recent theor-
etical works by Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997) and Aghion, Harris, Howitt and
Vickers (2001). The leapfrogging approach is replaced by assuming "step-by-step"
technological progress. That is, a ﬁrm that is lagging behind the technological leader
in the industry must catch up with the leader before becoming a leader itself. In
contrast to earlier Schumpeterian models competing technologies can coexist and
the successful follower in the market intensiﬁes the technology competition between
the ﬁrms. In the striving for proﬁts the ﬁrms are forced to reduce production costs
by adopting more e!cient production technologies. This creates incentives to innov-
ate in the sense that an innovating ﬁrm could capture proﬁts from the rival. Intense
competition does not even allow the leader to rest on its laurels, because of the riskof being challenged by the follower.
In this paper, we extend the model of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001). First, we
study how tax ﬁnanced direct public R&D subsidies aect ﬁrms’ dynamically op-
timal R&D decisions. Second, given the optimal R&D decisions of the ﬁrms, we
study the interaction between the eectiveness of direct R&D subsidies and market
structure. The theory of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001), and the extension developed
in this paper, give rise to two main predictions. First, the relationship between
product market competition and innovation has an inverted-U shape. Second, due
to the complementarity between the incentive eects of intensiﬁed product market
competition and an R&D subsidy, R&D subsidies tend to only steepen the inverted-
U shape relationship; at extremely low and extremely high degrees of competition
R&D subsidies may not have the desired eect of boosting innovative activity. On
the contrary, at moderate levels of competition, ﬁrms receiving public R&D subsidies
may innovate more than those not receiving any public aid.
Given these two rather straightforward theoretical predictions, we proceed to test
the two predictions with Finnish ﬁrm level data. For this purpose, we have compiled
a unique data set of Finnish ﬁrms, covering patenting activity, R&D information,
R&D subsidies and accounting data.
In the empirical part of the paper, we ﬁnd relatively strong evidence in favor of
the inverted-U shape hypothesis in the Finnish data. Moreover, we ﬁnd some evid-
ence of complementarity between product market competition1 and R&D subsidies.
Namely, our results suggest that the inverted-U relationship tends to be steeper
when also R&D subsidies are considered. However, this result should be interpreted
with some caution, given that the direct eect of an R&D subsidy on our dierent
measures of innovation was found to be negative, indicating that R&D subsidies on
average tend to reduce the probability of innovating. A further ﬁnding is that in-
1Our measure for product market competition is the Lerner index or price cost margin which
is constructed by calculating operating proﬁt over value.of gross output.dustries with more dispersed technology levels tend to innovate less than industries
with more equal levels of technology across the ﬁrms. This result is also in line with
the model of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001), which suggests that competition has a
stronger impact on innovation for industries that are closer in technology space.
Regarding policy implications, our results quite strongly suggest that within-
industry product market competition should be taken into consideration in designing
public interventions to R&D activity. On one hand, our theoretical results suggest
that the greatest additionality would be achieved in industries with moderate levels
of competition. On the other hand, selective R&D subsidy schemes for middle-range
productivity ﬁrms are a form of public intervention that might foster innovation.
In order to increase the competitiveness of the industry, followers (i.e. companies
lagging behind the leaders) should be encouraged to challenge the leader and thus
intensify the competition. This form of subsidy should be directed at the middle-
range-productivity ﬁrms as the least productive ﬁrms will be exposed to the selection
eect. In other words, the risk of subsidizing the least productive ﬁrms is very high,
as they might be enforced to quickly exit the market. Thus it can be argued that it is
irresponsible to tax payers to subsidize the least e!cient ﬁrms in the market, as the
return on such investment is quite insecure. The selective R&D subsidy scheme can
be criticized on the grounds that it does not oer a juste retour to industry leaders,
who arguably still pay the highest corporate taxes. Thus, it would be di!cult to
justify such a policy.
A moderate version of the former public intervention is to encourage R&D joint
ventures between large and small companies. As R&D costs for developing success-
ful innovations are high and the time frames of innovations are short, it has become
almost impossible for small entrants to compete with leaders in many industries.
Joint ventures are one solution for small ﬁrms to overcome the thresholds of critical
mass in many industries. For example, in the biotech industry, there are only a fewcompanies in the world that can cover the critical mass for developing a successful
concept. It is thus extremely important to get companies to work together in re-
search consortia via publicly subsidized joint venture schemes. This holds especially
for small countries, where the absolute mass of research is limited. In Finland, Tekes
has developed instruments especially designed to promote national and international
networking. The grants awarded to large companies are conditional on some degree
of networking or other type of cooperation e.g. with subcontractors. This may im-
portantly facilitate the knowledge spillovers between ﬁrms. Yet, one may recognice
that in some case co-operation may reduce competition, when rival companies are
working in close co-operation in the R&D projects.Tiivistelmä
Innovatiivisuuden korostaminen taloudellisen kasvun lähteenä on vaikuttanut oleel-
lisesti kehittyneiden maiden talouspolitiikkaan: inhimillisen pääoman ja koulutuk-
sen merkitystä korostetaan, samoin elinikäistä oppimista ja innovaatiojärjestelmän
tärkeyttä osana laajempaa kansantalouden instituutioiden verkostoa. Yhteiskunnal-
lisessa keskustelussa törmää nykyään yhä useammin myös käsitteeseen osaamispe-
rusteinen yhteiskunta. Suomeakin pidetään ja halutaan kehittää edelleen tiedon ja
osaamisen yhteiskuntana. Jopa EU:n komissio on asettanut keskeiseksi tavoitteeksi
Euroopan luotsaamisen 10 vuodessa yhdeksi maailman kilpailukykyisimmistä osaa-
misperusteisista yhteiskunnista maailmassa. Mutta miten tähän päästään ja mikä
on julkisen toiminnan rooli tässä pyrkimyksessä, ei ole lainkaan itsestään selvää.
Perinteisesti, julkisen t&k —politiikan takana on ajatus, että yritykset voivat
allokoida liian paljon, tai liian vähän resursseja uuden tiedon tuottamiseen. Tämä
voi johtua erilaisista markkinoiden epätäydellisyyksistä kuten rahoitusmarkkinoiden
toimimattomuudesta, mutta myös tiedon julkishyödykkeen ominaisuuksista tuotan-
nontekijänä. Tieto muistuttaa julkista hyödykettä siinä mielessä, että sen tois-
tamiseen ei liity kustannuksia.
Toisin kuin julkista hyödykettä tietoa pystytään kuitenkin sulkemaan pois
muiden käytöstä esimerkiksi patentein tai rajoittamalla muuten tiedon leviämistä.
Markkinoiden toimiessa epätäydellisesti, patentit varmistavat ainakin väliaikaises-
ti monopoliaseman jonkin tuotteen tai tuotantotavan suhteen. Ns. schumpeter-
iläisen näkemyksen mukaan monopolivoitot toimivat puolestaan innovaatiotoimin-
nan kannustimena, koska niiden avulla voidaan korvata teknologian kehittämis-
estä aiheutuvia kustannuksia. Tämän seurauksena tutkimus- ja kehitystoiminnan
(t&k —toiminnan) tukemisessa on perinteisesti korostettu suoria t&k —avustuksia
ja patenttipolitiikkaa. Koko kansantalouden tasolla innovaatioiden yleiseen käyt-
töön päästäminen ja imitoinnin mahdollistaminen olisi suuri, mutta samalla voitto-jen aleneminen johtaisi lopulta myös t&k-toiminnan lamaantumiseen. Kaikkia kil-
pailua lisääviä tekijöitä, kuten esimerkiksi patenttisuojan liberalisointia pidetään
taloudellisen kasvun kannalta haitallisena. Siten esimerkiksi innovaatioiden omistu-
soikeuksien suojeleminen patenttien muodossa on perinteisen schumpeteriläisen teo-
rian kannalta oleellinen osa pitkän aikavälin kasvua edistävää politiikkaa: uusien in-
novaatioiden patenttisuojan avulla varmistetaan että yritysten innovaatiohalukkuus
pysyy korkeana monopolivoittojen vuoksi.
Talousteoreettisissa malleissa tähän johtopäätökseen tullaan ensisijassa siitä
syystä, että tuotekehityksen kärjessä olevien yritysten oletetaan kilpailun kiristyessä
lopettavan innovoinnin. Tämä oletus lienee varsin epärealistinen ja kuvaa huonos-
ti kilpailuasetelmia teknologiamarkkinoilla. Näkemys kilpailun haitallisuudesta on
myös ristiriidassa klassisen talousteorian kanssa, jonka mukaan kilpailu on terveel-
listä taloudelle tehokkuussyistä. Esimerkiksi Michael Porterin (1990) teorian mukaan
kilpailu kannustaa yrityksiä dierentioimaan tuotteita ja tehostamaan toimintatapo-
ja johtavan markkina aseman säilyttämiseksi ja kustannustehokkuuden lisäämiseksi.
Samaan johtopäätökseen ovat tulleet Geroski (1994), Nickell (1996) ja Blundell, Grif-
ﬁth ja Van Reenen (1999) empiirisissä tutkimuksissaan, joiden tulokset viittaavat
positiiviseen korrelaatioon kilpailun ja yritysten innovatiivisuuden välillä.
Uudet näkemykset kilpailun, yritysten innovoinnin ja tätä kautta tuottavuuden
välisestä riippuvuudesta korostavat innovaatioiden ja kilpailun käänteisen U-käyrän
muotoista suhdetta (Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997) and Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers (2001)). Käsillä olevassa työssä keskeisen mielenkiinnon kohteena ovat
juuri kyseiset mallit.
Kuten schumpeteriläisissäkin malleissa, näissä malleissa voitontavoittelu pakot-
taa yritykset innovoimaan: tuotekehityksen tavoitteena on tuoda markkinoille
laadullisesti parempia tuotteita kuin kilpailija ja siten saavuttaa monopoliasema.
Schumpeteriläisistä malleista poiketen, rinnakkaiset teknologiat voivat kuitenkinkilpailla keskenään teknologiajohtajuudesta ja siten kilpailla ainakin väliaikaises-
ta monopoliasemasta. Samanaikaiset kilpailevat teknologiat luovat lisäkannustimia
innovoinnille ja tehokkaampien tuotantoprosessien suunnittelulle. Yritykset eivät voi
kuitenkaan vapaasti imitoida markkinoilla jo olevaa teknologiaa ja vain aivan uusin-
ta teknologiaa pystytään suojelemaan patenteilla. Tämä johtaa kilpailutilanteeseen,
jossa yritykset voivat olla tasoissa (tasapelitilanne) tai tilanteessa, jossa jokin yritys
on teknologiajohtaja-asemassa suhteessa toisiin yrityksiin.
Näissä malleissa, kilpailun kiristymisen vaikutus tuotekehittelyyn on erilainen
tasapelitilanteissa ja tilanteissa, missä yritysten teknologinen taso eroaa toisistaan
(seuraaja-johtaja tilanne) Tasapelitilanteessa olevan yrityksen motiivina tuoteke-
hittelylle on pyrkimys erilaistaa yritysten välistä kilpailutilannetta. Tällöin kil-
pailun kiristyminen itse asiassa kannustaa yrityksiä lisäämään tuotekehittelyä. Tätä
voidaan perustella sillä, että kun kilpailu kiristyy tasapelitilanteessa, myös voitot
vähenevät. Yritykset pyrkivät tällöin "pakenemaan"kilpailutilannetta tuotekehityk-
sen avulla. Tätä kilpailun innovaatioita lisäävää vaikutusta voidaan kutsua kilpailun
pakenemisvaikutukseksi.
Tilanteessa, jossa yritysten teknologinen osaaminen eroaa toisistaan, kiristyvä
kilpailu puolestaan vähentää seuraajan kannustimia innovoida. Tämä johtuu siitä,
että tasapelitilanteen saavuttaminen sisältää pienempiä voitonmahdollisuuksia kuin
aikaisemmin: kiristyvä kilpailu hidastaa seuraajan tuotekehitystoimintaa. Kilpailun
innovaatioita heikentävä vaikutus on siten schumpeteriläisen mallin mukainen. Kil-
pailun kiristymisen kokonaisvaikutus innovointeihin ja talouden kasvuun seuraa lop-
ulta ns. koostumisvaikutuksesta. Sen voidaan ajatella kuvaavan talouden eri toimi-
alojen kilpailutilanteiden muuttumista. Esimerkiksi innovaatioiden omistusoikeuk-
sien löysääminen saattaa nopeuttaa innovaatioiden keskimääräistä syntymistahtia
lisäämällä niiden toimialojen osuutta taloudessa, missä yritykset ovat tasapeliti-
lanteessa. Tämä tarkoittaa myös sitä että, säännöstelypolitiikka (joka vaikuttaa kil-pailuun) ja patenttien suojelu omistusoikeuksilla (joka vaikuttaa mahdollisuuksiin
imitoida) eivät vaikuta pelkästään suoraan yritysten kannustimiin innovoida, vaan
myös epäsuorasti kyseisen koostumisvaikutuksen kautta. Kun nämä edellä mainitut
vaikutukset huomioidaan, kilpailun kiristymisen ja innovaatioiden välillä vallitsee
lopulta käänteisen U-käyrän muotoinen suhde.
Edellä esitetyn käänteisein U-käyrä hypoteesin lisäksi tässä tutkimuksessa
tarkastellaan myös kilpailun ja suorien t&k -avustusten yhteisvaikutusta samaises-
sa mallikehikossa. Teoreettiset tulokset viittaavat siihen, että kilpailun ja t&k
—avustusten kannustinvaikutukset voivat olla toisiaan tukevia. Olennaista tässä
yhteisvaikutuksessa on se, että suoran t&k —tuen innovointia kannustava vaikutus
riippuu toimialan sisäisen kilpailun asteesta: Ensin, hyvin alhaisilla tai hyvin korkeil-
la kilpailun asteilla t&k —avustusten innovointia lisäävät vaikutukset voivat jäädä
hyvin pieniksi. Toiseksi, toimialan sisäisen kilpailun ollessa kohtuullinen, suoran t&k
—tuen innovointia lisäävä vaikutus voi olla merkittävä. (kts kuvio 1).
Mikäli edellä kuvatut hypoteesit pätevät reaalimaailmassa on tietenkin empiiri-
nen kysymys. Käsillä olevassa tutkimuksessa näitä hypoteeseja testaan empiirisesti
suomalaisella yritystason aineistolla. Yritystason aineisto sisältää tietoa yritysten
taloudellisesta asemasta, patenteista, t&k —toiminnasta ja t&k —avustuksista. Em-
piirisessä tutkimuksessa yritysten innovatiivisuutta mitataan patenttien ja patent-
tisitaatioiden avulla. Toimialojen sisäistä kilpailullisuutta mitataan vuorostaan ns.
Lerner indeksin avulla. Lerner indeksi operationalisoidaan empiirisessä tutkimukses-
sa laskemalla yritysten voittojen suhde tuotannon arvoon. Tämä kilpailullisuuden
mittari voidaan sitten ulottaa toimialatasolle laskemalla yrityskohtaisten tunnus-
lukujen keskiarvo tai mediaani.
Empiiriset tulokset osoittavat teoreettisen hypoteesin mukaisesti, että kun kil-
pailullisuuden astetta arvioidaan Lerner indeksin avulla, kilpailun ja innovaatioiden
välillä näyttää vallitsevan käänteisen U-käyrän muotoinen suhde (kts. kuvio 9).Lisäksi tulokset osoittavat, että kilpailun ja t&k-tukien välillä esiintyy jonkin-
asteinen yhteisvaikutus. Käänteinen U-käyrä kilpailun ja innovaatioiden välillä
jyrkkenee kun patenteilla mitattua innovatiivisuutta selitetään toimialan sisäisen
kilpailun lisäksi myös yritysten saamilla t&k —tuilla. Tätä tulosta on kuitenkin syytä
tulkita varauksella, sillä tulokset osoittavat toisaalta, että t&k -avustusten suorat
vaikutukset ovat kaikilla patentteihin perustuvilla innovaatiomittareillamme negati-
iviset. Tämä näyttäisi viittaavan siihen, että t&k —avustukset keskimäärin hidasta-
vat toimialojen innovatiivisuutta (kts taulukko 12).
Päällimmäinen politiikkaimplikaatio, joka nousee esille tuloksista on se, että
toimialojen sisäiset kilpailutilanteet tulisi ottaa huomioon myönnettäessä suoria
t&k —avustuksia yrityksille. Tutkimuksen teoreettiset tulokset osoittavat, että t&k-
avustukset tuottavat suurimman t&k —toiminnan lisäyksen kilpailun keskitasoilla.
Selektiivinen t&k —politiikka, jossa tuottavuudeltaan keskitason yrityksiä tuettai-
siin, saattaisi edistää innovaatiotoimintaa. Tuottavuudeltaan keskitason yritysten
kannustaminen innovointiin voimistaisi parhaiten kilpailun innovatiivisuutta tuke-
vaa vaikutusta. Matalimman tuottavuuden omaavia yrityksiä uhkaa konkurssi tai
markkinoilta poistuminen, jolloin näiden tukeminen on epävarmaa ja jopa kan-
nattamatonta. Selektiivisten t&k-tukien ongelmallisuus lienee siinä, että korkeim-
man tuottavuuden omaavat teknologiset johtajat, jotka usein myös ovat suurimmat
veronmaksajat, eivät näin saisi vastinetta verorahoilleen ja siten tämä tukikeino
tuskin saisi kannatusta.
Lievempi versio edellä mainitusta keinosta tasoittaa toimialan kilpailua on
yhteistyösopimukset ja tutkimustyön verkottaminen. Pienten yritysten on monel-
la teknologian alalla lähes mahdotonta tulla toimeen yksin, koska t&k —projektit
ovat usein suuria ja pitkäkestoisia. Yhteistyösopimukset on tässä mielessä oivallinen
keino edesauttaa kriittisen massan edellyttävien mittakaavojen saavuttamisessa. Es-
imerkiksi bioteknologian alalla vain harvat yritykset ovat riittävän suuria pystyäk-seen yksin kehittämään taloudellisesti menestyksekkäitä tuotteita. Siten yhteistyötä
on tärkeä edistää julkisin keinoin. Suomessa on kehitetty tukimuotoja jotka ovat
omiaan lisäämään verkottumista ja yhteistyötä t&k —toiminnassa sekä kotimaassa
että kansainvälisesti. Suurille yrityksille myönnetyt tuen ovat ehdollisia yhteistyölle
pienempien yritysten kanssa. Tämä yhteistyön edistäminen saattaa olla tärkeässä
asemassa tuottavuushajonnan pienentämisessä, jolla näyttäisi olevan negatiivinen
vaikutus innovaatioihin. Samalla on kuitenkin huomattava, että yhteistyö voi jois-
sakin tapauksissa myös rajoittaa kilpailua ja tätä kautta hidastaa innovaatioita.1 Introduction
In modern societies, a large part of the long-run economic growth measured by per
capita GDP, is explained by increases in the productivity of labour. Productivity
of labour, in turn, can largely be explained by accumulation of physical capital and
particularly, accumulation and spillovers of knowledge and technological progress.
This has generated a growing literature that aims at understanding the complex
processes leading ﬁrms to innovate and thus promote technological progress. At the
same time, the recognized importance of innovations and the pace of technological
change poses an important challenge for science, technology and innovation (STI)
policy, since the markets may allocate too much, or too little, of its factors of produc-
tion to Research and Development (R&D). The allocation of factors of production
between, say, R&D and investment in physical capital may fail to be optimal due
to externalities, or due to ﬁnancial and informational frictions that do not allow for
ﬁrms to make optimal decisions from the point of view of the whole economy.
Public policy can then inﬂuence the allocation of resources between dierent
factors of production by directly changing relative factor prices, providing ﬁnancial
intermediation that enables ﬁrms to overcome ﬁnancial frictions, or ﬁnding more
indirect ways of overcoming informational frictions that exist in the markets. In
countries with reasonably well developed innovation systems, all three intervention
schemes are in place, yet they can take various forms and dierent degrees of em-
phasis.
In Finland, the national innovation system has gained essential public support
during recent decades. In 1981 its GERD/GDP ratio (1.2 %) was clearly below the
OECD average. But large increases in privately funded R&D, as well as increasing
public investment in the national innovation system, has made Finland one of the
highest ranking countries in the world with respect to R&D expenditure measure;
its GERD/GDP was 3.42% in 2001. As for public interventions, a wide range of
1policies and organizations have been established with the speciﬁc aim of enhancing
the performance of the Finnish innovation system. These agencies support most
aspects of the innovation process, such as research and development, invention, ven-
ture capital ﬁnance, and internationalization.2 The core of the national innovation
system, or as Georghiou et al. (2003) say, the “implementation infrastructure”, con-
sists of the organizations operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade and
Finance (MTI), that oers a wide range of innovation ﬁnancing instruments and
support services.
The motivation for public intervention is well founded and rarely questioned, but
the particular form of intervention remains a subject of debate among endogenous
growth theorists. In endogenous growth theories, technical advance is regarded as
an economic variable, and it thus becomes a part of the optimal decision. It will
be motivated by the quest for proﬁts and substantially aected by the initial alloc-
ation of resources. As a result, the ﬁrst natural question that arises is if perfectly
competitive market continues to retain its e!ciency, and if not, what would be an
arrangement that would be superior. Alternatively, the question is whether we can
continue to rely on individual self-interest to promote an e!cient aggregate out-
come. Since the thoughts of Schumpeter (1934), few economists believe that perfect
competition e!ciently allocates resources necessary to maintain technical advance.3
R a t h e r ,i ti sl i k e l yt h a ts o m ed e g r e eo fi m p e r f e c t i o n ,c o m b i n e dp e r h a p sw i t hs o m e
degree of government ﬁnancing of Research and Development is the best alternative.
As a result, one may argue that a real challenge to successful public intervention, of
whatever kind, resides in the complex interaction of economic incentives and market
structure.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fex ante incentives and a market structure that induces ﬁrms
2For recent evaluations of the Finnish Innovation Support System, see Berghäll and Kiander
(2003) and Georgiou et al. (2003).
3See Kamien and Schwartz (1975).
2to conduct R&D activities was emphasized already by Schumpeter (1934) in his in-
ﬂuential work on the theory of economic development. Schumpeter (1934) came to
the conclusion that market power (or monopoly power) provides essential incentive
for ﬁrms to innovate. According to Schumpeter, the incentives to perform R&D
depend on the rent prospects of a successful innovator, while the incumbent mono-
poly has weak incentives to innovate, since it already enjoys monopoly rents. These
ideas where further developed by Arrow (1962), who argued that an outside ﬁrm
c a ng a i nm o r ef r o ma ni n n o v a t i o nt h a na ni n c u m b e n tb ya p p r o p r i a t i n gt h ep r o ﬁ t s
of the incumbent. Arrow’s argument was based on the view that knowledge has
the properties of a public good in that it can be consumed by many simultaneously
without impinging on the value to any individual user and that it is not possible to
exclude others from making use of new knowledge.
This Arrow (replacement) eect, together with the ideas of Schumpeter (1934),
led to the controversial paradigm according to which competition drives out innov-
ative activity by reducing monopoly rents and is thus harmful to economic growth.
Moreover, the problems related to excluding others from making use of knowledge
created elsewhere suggests that returns on innovation as perceived by the individual
innovator will diverge from those accruing to society as a whole.
Schumpeter’s paradigm was later formalized in the New Growth Theory, which
has developed since the mid-1980s. New Growth Theory considers long run growth
to be endogenously determined by R&D and technological change. Indeed the New
Growth Theory has had a strong impact on policymakers. For already several dec-
ades governments throughout the developed world have pursued policies to improve
the innovation performance of domestic industries. Until recently, R&D policy has
focused largely on public intervention in the form of subsidies to private R&D and
developing the patent system, in order to remedy the non-excludability problem.
3Schumpeter’s original ideas and related more formal theories of economic growth4
have correctly emphasized the interaction between market structure and ex ante in-
centives. However, these theories are still too rudimentary to fully describe strategic
decision making in an environment where interaction between the ﬁrms is inherently
dynamic and decisions are made under uncertainty (dynamic in the sense that the
ﬁrms’ pricing power can change over time and uncertain as regards ex post proﬁts).
Further, the idea of the importance of ex post monopoly rents has been contradicted
by recent empirical work. The ﬁndings of Blundell et al. (1995) and Nickell (1996)
suggest a positive correlation between product market competition and productivity
growth within a ﬁrm or an industry.5
In line with the empirical ﬁndings of a positive relationship between productivity
growth and product market competition, a more gradualist approach to technolo-
gical progress has been presented in recent theoretical works by Aghion, Harris and
Vickers (1997) and Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001). The leapfrogging
approach is replaced by an assumed “step-by-step” technological progress. That is,
a ﬁrm that is lagging behind the technological leader in the industry, must catch up
with the leader before becoming a leader itself. In this framework, innovation in-
centives depend more on the dierence between post-innovation and pre-innovation
r e n t st h a no np o s t - i n n o v a t i o nr e n t sper se. In this case, more intense product mar-
ket competition may end up fostering innovations and growth as it may reduce a
ﬁrm’s pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces its post-innovation rents. In
other words, competition may increase the incremental proﬁts from innovation and
thereby encourage R&D investment. These changes in assumptions enable an expli-
cit analysis of the interplay between product market competition, innovations and
4See Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
5Another criticism of the Schumpeterian paradigm is that the leapfrogging assumption (i.e. the
monopolist market being overtaken by an entrant) ﬁts poorly into the reality of many turbulent
high-tech industries, where innovations contain tacit knowledge. The increasing amount of tacit
knowledge attached to the technology makes imitation complicated and thus it is seldom possible
for an entrant to sidestep the monopolist without ﬁrst having to break even.
4growth, by allowing the ﬁrms in an industry to race neck-and-neck.
The model of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001) generates the prediction of an existence
of an inverted-U relationship between product market competition and innovation.
This prediction has been tested against UK company data in a study by Aghion et al.
(2002), where support was found for the theory of an inverted-U relationship between
competition and innovation. It is worth noting, however, that already Kamien and
Schwartz (1974) analyzed the existence of a degree of rivalry that would maximize
the rate of technological development. They found that complete absence of rivalry
may be most conducive to rapid introduction of innovations in some circumstances,
while an intermediate degree of rivalry is more likely than monopoly to yield the
most rapid development rate when innovator’s expected quasi-rent is high.
In this paper, we make a rather modest but, we believe, useful theoretical exten-
sion to the model of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001). First, we study how tax ﬁnanced
direct public R&D subsidies aect the ﬁrms’ dynamically optimal R&D decisions.
Second, given the optimal R&D decisions of the ﬁrms, we study the interaction
between the eectiveness of direct R&D subsidies and the market structure. It is
shown that, at extremely low and extremely high degrees of competition, a direct
R&D subsidy does not have the desired eect of boosting innovative activity. How-
ever, an elementary simulation exercise suggests that a direct R&D subsidy has a
positive eect at moderate levels of competition.
Thus, the theory of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001) and the extension developed
in this paper give rise to two predictions: (l) The relationship between product
market competition and innovation has an inverted-U shape (ll) at moderate levels
of competition ﬁrms receiving direct public R&D subsidy may innovate more than
those not receiving any public aid.
Given the two rather straightforward theoretical predictions, we proceed to test-
ing the two predictions with Finnish ﬁrm level data. In order to do this, we have
5compiled a unique data set of Finnish ﬁrms, covering patenting activity, R&D in-
formation, R&D subsidies and accounting data.
Our main results are that an inverted-U shape can be attained with each of
constructed innovation measures and that there is evidence of a complementary
relationship between competition and R&D subsidies. However, the results also
suggest that, on the aggregate level, R&D subsidies tend to dampen the innovation
rate of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents analytically the
model of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001) and develops the extensions to the model. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the empirical issues of which variables are best suited for measuring
their theoretical counterparts developed in the previous section. Section 4 provides
a description of the data, with emphasis on USPTO patent data, which in this study
is combined for the ﬁrst time with Finnish accounting data. Section 5 discusses the
empirical methods used. Section 6 concludes and provides a short discussion of the
main policy implications that derive from the results.
62 Theoretical issues of competition and innova-
tion
The importance of the pace of technological change for the economic wellbeing of
the society has given rise to a number of formal models that focus on economic
incentives behind ﬁrms’ innovative activities. These formal models are often referred
to as endogenous growth models or models of technological progress. In this paper,
we focus on a speciﬁc model of Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), which
gives a theoretical basis for an inverted-U relationship between degree of product
market competition and rate of innovations. For convenience, we refer to this model
as AHHV. The innovation process is assumed to be of a “step-by-step” character,
where the follower in any industry must ﬁrst catch up with the technological leader
before being able to become a leader itself. In contrast to Schumpeterian growth
models, the incumbent ﬁrm may also innovate in this model.
From this it follows, that innovation incentives depend more on the dierence
between post-innovation rents and pre-innovation rents than upon post-innovation
rents per se. In particular, more intense product market competition (PMC) may
stimulate ﬁrms’ innovative activities because it may reduce the ﬁrms’ pre-innovation
rents by more than it reduces their post-innovation rents. In other words, compet-
ition may increase the incremental proﬁts from innovating and thereby encourage
R&D investment. This is in sharp contrast to the Schumpeterian prediction.6
2.1 Production technology
The model assumes that the economy is a continuum of intermediate goods produ-
cing industries indexed by l 5 [0>1] and using labor as the only input. The ﬁnal
output of the economy, \ , is produced using input services from the intermediate
6The theoretical framework and the mathematical formalization presented in this section is that
of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001) except where explicitly mentioned or ascribed to others.





where Tl (w) denotes the output of industry l at time w,a n dln\w denotes the log of the
ﬁnal output at time w=7 It is further assumed that the ﬁnal output is produced by a
ﬁnal goods sector using the aggregate of all the intermediate goods. Thus the model
considers an economy with a ﬁxed set of intermediate goods-producing sectors (each
in the interval [0>1]) and one ﬁnal goods sector. Each intermediate goods producing
industry is assumed to be duopolistic with respect to both production and research
activities.8 T h u s ,i ne a c hd u o p o l i s t i ci n d u s t r y ,o n l yo n et y p eo fg o o d si sp r o d u c e d .
In other words, industry l produces two goods, Dl and El,e a c ho ft h es a m et y p e
but with potential quality variations.
The assumption of duopolistic industries is important in the sense that it enables
restriction of the analysis to the within-industry situation. This distinguishes the
model from the Schumpeterian models with monopolistic competition, where the
ﬁrms producing intermediate goods are seen as an entity, leading to formalizations
of two or three-sector economies.9 Moreover, duopolistic competition enables the
analysis of the eects of changes in degree of competition on optimal production
decisions of the ﬁrms within a particular industry.
As tDl and tEl respectively denote the output of the two ﬁrms in each industry
7The production function used by AHHV is of the functional form ﬁrst introduced by Spence
(1976) and later reﬁned by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), in which inputs are entered in an additively
separable manner. The original form of the production function sums the discrete number of
inputs, but the continuous nature of the inputs, and thus a shift to an integral over a continuum
of inputs does not change the results (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995] ). In AHHV the range
of varieties of intermediate goods is normalized to one.
8In the model, the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms conduct the R&D themselves, with the
objective of reducing production costs.
9See e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1992).
8l> the industry output is generated according to:
Tl = i (tDl>t El)> (2.2)
where Tl is an aggregate of the two goods produced by duopolistic industry l> deﬁned
by production technology i (·).H e r ei (·) is a symmetric subproduction function of
the intermediate industry which is homogeneous of degree one in its two arguments
and independent of l. In their model, AHHV focus on the particular case where
the production technology has Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and hence
becomes:






 >5 [0>1]> (2.3)
Ah i g h e r 5 [0>1] reﬂects a higher degree of substitutability between the two
production factors in industry l> t
Dl and t
El.10
The production function in (2.1) is logarithmically additive and separable for
the quantity of goods Tl. T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h em a r g i n a lr e v e n u eo fe x p e n d i t u r e
on intermediate inputs from any industry l is independent of the amount spent on
intermediate inputs from any other industry, at any time w= As shown in Grossman
and Helpman (1991), the logarithmic technology implies that the level of spending
that maximizes output in (2.1) is attained when the ﬁnal goods sector spends equal
amounts on each intermediate goods-producing industry, at any time w.T h u s , i n
equilibrium, the ﬁnal goods sector spends a common amount on the output Tl of
each industry l. This common amount is normalized to unity using the expenditure
a sn u m e r a i r ef o rt h ep r i c e so ft h et w og o o d si ni n d u s t r i e ssDl and sEl at any time w.
Thus the ﬁnal goods sector chooses each tDl and tEl in order to maximize i (tDl>t El)
subject to the budget constraint sDl{Dl + sEl{El =1 .11 From this maximization
10A special case is when  =1, Tl = tDl + tEl= That is, when the two intermediate inputs
produced in industry l are perfect substitutes.
11As will be discussed later, labor supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic. The wage rate
z(w) is considered to be exogenous (i.e. the only factor cost, as labor is the only input, will be


























The properties in (2.1) and (2.3) allow us to restrict the analysis to one industry
and thus, the industry index l can be ignored.
2.2 Product-market competition








each intermediate inputs-producing ﬁrm m f a c e si sg i v e nb ym =
(13m)
(13) and where
m = smtm> denotes the ﬁrms’ revenue. Substituting (2.4) into the revenue equation














>m = D>E= (2.5)








fm> m = D>E> (2.6)





m (1  )
1  m
>m = D>E= (2.7)
Equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) can be solved for unique equilibrium revenues, prices
and proﬁts. Given the degree of substitutability, , the equilibrium proﬁt of each
exogenous) and normalized to one. Thus the expenditure on output of industry l at time w is
SlTl =1for all l and w.
10ﬁrm m is determined by its relative production cost. The relative production cost, },
is calculated by dividing the unit production cost of ﬁrm m b yt h eu n i tp r o d u c t i o n
cost of the other ﬁrm m, i.e. } =
fm
f3m= This implies that an equiproportional
r e d u c t i o ni nb o t hfD and fE would induce the ﬁrms to adjust the price in the same
proportion without aecting the degree of competition and not hence ﬁrm’s revenues
and proﬁts. Consequently, only a change in relative proﬁt levels is of interest from
the ﬁrm’s point of view.















The substitutability parameter  in the proﬁt function (2.7) corresponds to the
standard measures of competition and can be used to parameterize the degree of
competition within each industry. This can also be motived by the arguments of
Boone (2000). Namely, he points out that any parameter positively aecting the
proﬁtability of having lower unit production costs or products of better quality
than other ﬁrms is a suitable measure of product market competition. Examples of
parameterizations of competition are the number of intermediate input varieties (and
thus producers), a reduction in entry barriers, a switch from Cournot to Bertrand
competition, and a reduction in import taris. All these parameterizations have a
common feature: an increase in competition raises the proﬁts of an e!cient ﬁrm
relative to the proﬁts of a less e!cient ﬁrm. In other words, competition reallocates
proﬁts from ine!cient to more e!cient ﬁrms. This is called the allocation eect.
Another ee c ti st h a tt h ea b s o l u t ep r o ﬁ to ft h el e a s te !cient ﬁrms in the market
is reduced by a higher degree of competition. These two eects together imply
the eect that goes under the name selection eect of competition: more intense
product market competition increases the relative market share of ﬁrms with lower
11unit production costs or better products. The reason why many studies examine
relative proﬁts is, according to Boone (2000), that the marginal cost dierentials
between ﬁrms in the market are mapped into proﬁt dierentials. This mapping
becomes steeper as the competition becomes more intense, in the sense that a given
cost dierential is mapped into a larger proﬁt dierential.
More formally,  is a monotonically increasing transformation of the elasticity





between the two rivals’ outputs in any industry.






faced by the ﬁrm, given it’s market share  of the industry revenue.12





which is often used to characterize market structure in the literature of Industrial
Organization. Consequently, by any of the measures, the degree of market power
i sm e a s u r e di n v e r s e l yb yt h ep a r a m e t e r. In the extreme case where  =0 > there
is a minimal degree of competition, while in the opposite case where  =1 ,the
two ﬁrms are engaged in Bertrand competition with undierentiated products. The
latter case results in perfect competition where both ﬁrms use the same production
technology and hence have the same unit production cost.
A prominent feature of the Lerner index is that it can easily be operationalized
empirically. Moreover, AHHV show that the Lerner index is a decreasing function
of the substitutability parameter , even after taking into account that the ﬁrm’s
Lerner index also depends on the ﬁrm’s market share . In order to remove the
eects of market share, AHHV show that a measure for , derived by rewriting
(2.9), could be used as an alternative measure of competition. In their empirical
12Also Boone (2000) argues that any parameter increase resulting in increased relative proﬁtab-
ility of technologically more advanced ﬁrms is a suitable measure of product market competition.
12analysis, AHHV ﬁnd that both measures produce similar results. We shall discuss
the empirical operationalization of the Lerner index in more detail in section 3.2.
2.3 Technology levels, R&D and innovation
Each ﬁrm uses labor as the only input according to a constant-returns production
function. As the wage rate is taken as given, and the unit costs of production of
the two ﬁrms in an industry, fD and fE> are independent of the quantities produced,
a ﬁrm’s unit cost depends only on the level of its technology. The unit cost of
production can be expressed as fm = z\> where z i st h ee c o n o m y - w i d ew a g er a t e
and \ is the ﬁrm’s unit labor requirement. For convenience, the economy-wide wage
rate can be normalized to one and thus the ﬁrm’s unit cost can be written simply
as fm = \. Technological progress results in a decreasing unit labor requirement, \>
and hence in a decrease in unit cost. Consequently, technological progress in the
model is characterized as “labour saving technological progress”, similarly to many
standard models of economic growth.
The most essential novelty of the model is in the way technological progress takes
place within each industry. Namely, it is assumed that technology advances through
an innovation process where each new innovation improves productivity step-by-
step. This assumption implies that it is impossible to leapfrog from being a follower
(i.e. having higher production costs than the rival) in a duopoly to becoming a
leader in the duopoly (i.e. having lower production costs than the rival) without
ﬁrst breaking even. Given this, a situation where the ﬁrms have similar production
technologies and thus similar unit costs of production, must occur in the economy for
the leader position to change. We refer to these cases as “neck-and-neck” situations
in what follows. The step-by-step assumption implies a more gradualist approach
to innovation as compared with the Schumpeterian tradition. One may interpret
this as a situation where the companies producing intermediate goods must pursue
13R&D activity themselves instead of subcontracting for it. This is in line with reality
of many ﬁrms, especially of those in high-tech industries, where innovative activities
are carried out e.g. in separate R&D departments.
More formally, productivity is assumed to improve by a factor A1 each time
a ﬁrm innovates and thus the unit labor requirement falls by  with each new
innovation. Consequently, the relative cost of a ﬁrm that is q steps ahead (or q
steps behind if q?0)o fi t sr i v a li s} = 3q.13 Accordingly the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function
is !(3q>), which varies with the size of its lead and the degree of competition, .
Importantly, it can be shown that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt increases with the ﬁrm’s lead, q.
Moreover, the positive eect of the increase in lead vanishes when the intermediate
goods D and E become perfectly inelastic, i.e. as  $ 0. In other words, as the
product markets become more competitive, technological leadership becomes less
proﬁtable for the ﬁrm, in line with the traditional Schumpeterian paradigm.
2.3.1 R&D cost function
In order to pursue innovative activities, the ﬁrms hire R&D personnel. Each ﬁrm’s
R&D eo r ti st h u sm e a s u r e di nu n i t so fl a b o r ,w h i c hw en o wd e n o t eb y{.14 R&D
activity (i.e. the innovation process) is however uncertain and thus the innovations
do not increase linearly with an increase in R&D eort. It is instead assumed that
the arrival of a new successful innovation follows a Poisson process, where a ﬁrm at
the technological frontier (leader or neck-and-neck ﬁrm) moves one step ahead with
13It is assumed that the follower, who is q steps behind the leader, can catch up immediately
whenever she innovates. Thus a single innovation is enough for the follower to catch up with the
leader. Becoming a leader is still a step-by-step process, because it takes two innovations to go
from being a follower to becoming a leader. The one-step case is an alternative case where each
ﬁrm can move only one step ahead by innovating.
14Each industry is assumed to be duopolistic with respect to R&D as well as production. This
is a strong duopolistic assumption, implying that innovations are only made by ﬁrms currently in
the market. It further excludes the relaxing of the entry barriers and hence excludes increasing
the number of ﬁrms in the industry as a means of increasing competition.
14the Poisson hazard rate {.15 This Poisson assumption means that the probability
of a successful innovation depends only on the ﬁrm’s own R&D eort, and not on
i t sp r e v i o u si n n o v a t i o nh i s t o r y .
One can naturally think of a number of reasons why past research eort should
make success more likely, such as accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge and exper-
ience. However, there might also be reasons that would make succeeding innovation
less likely, for instance, because simple innovations were made ﬁrst or because of
more subtle issues related to incentives and deteriorating learning capacity of R&D
personnel. The Poisson assumption may thus be more plausible than it seems at a
ﬁrst glance. In any case, what is important is that the innovation process is inher-
ently stochastic, and the units of labor { employed in the R&D sector characterize
both the R&D eort and the probability (here called hazard rate) of a successful
innovation.
The technological follower has the advantage of imitation, and can thus have
a higher probability of innovating than the leader, at the same amount of R&D.
By employing the same amount of R&D personnel as the leader, {, the follower
innovates and hence catches up, at the hazard rate ({ + k).O n ew a yo fi n t e r p r e t i n g
the parameter k  0 is as approximating the absence of legal and regulatory im-
pediments associated with intellectual property right (IPR) regulations. The more
stringent the IPR rights (lower k), the more di!cult it is for followers to directly
exploit rivals’ technological discoveries. In this sense, the parameter k measures
complementary R&D spillovers.
15A Poisson hazard rate means that some random event [ is governed by a Poisson process.
This is the probability of an event happening between w and w + gw conditional to the event not
having taken place by time w. Analytically, it means that the chance of event [ occuring before w is
a random variable, whose distribution is exponential with the parameter {,t h a ti s ,t h ea r r i v a lr a t e
I (w) Prob[event occurs before w]=1h{w Thus the probability of the event occuring sometime
between w and w +gw is approximately h{wgw. In particular, the probability of an event occuring
within gw from now (when w =0 )is approximately gw= In this way  becomes the probability per
unit of time that the event will occur now, or equally the ﬂow probability of an event. Cf. Aghion
and Howitt (1998).
15Finally, the cost function of R&D (in units of labor), #({), is assumed to be





where  is the wage rate of workers employed in the R&D sector. The assumption
that ﬁrms face rising marginal costs in R&D has important implications for the
m o d e li nt h es e n s et h a ti ta l l o w sb o t ht h ei n c u m b e n tﬁ r ma n dt h ef o l l o w e rt oc o n d u c t
R&D activity simultaneously.
2.3.2 Optimal R&D intensity
The optimization problem that ﬁrms face in the duopoly is to maximize the expected
present value of the proﬁt ﬂow aected by an innovative advance by the ﬁrm.16
The only thing relevant for the ﬁrm in setting its R&D investment strategy is the
technological gap between ﬁrms (not the technology level itself) and whether the ﬁrm
is a leader, neck-and-neck or follower. It is thus the relative proﬁt, and not the level
of proﬁt, that determines ﬁrms’ strategies. The ﬁrms take into consideration that
the probabilities of innovation outcomes depend on their R&D eort, {.T h es a m e
R&D eort gives dierent probabilities for success (i.e. for taking out a successful
innovation) depending on the state of the ﬁrm. That is, whether the ﬁrm is a leader,
follower, or in a neck and neck situation.
Let {0>{ q and {3q denote respectively the R&D eorts of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm, a
leader in an industry with the technological gap q  1 and a follower in the industry.
R&D eorts represent the innovation probabilities, taking into account that the
16AHHV only consider pure strategic equilibria in perfect Markov strategies when formulating
the strategies of how ﬁrms optimize their R&D eort in a dynamic duopolistic game. Thus the
optimization problem follows a stationary Markov decision process. AHHV assume that Markov
equilibrium in the industries always exist in the model and this assumption allows the use of
Bellman’s principle of optimality and hence solving Bellman equations via dynamic programming.
The Bellman equations are used in this model to deﬁne an optimum in continuous time under
uncertainty. As the optimum is deﬁned in continuous time, the proﬁt is a ﬂow.
16R&D process is a stochastic Poisson process. Further, Y0, Yq and Y3q denote the
expected values of their respective proﬁts. The equilibrium rate of interest is the
time preference, u. The expected present value of the proﬁts of a leader, Yq,c a n
be derived from the Bellman equation where the R&D eort of the follower, {3q,i s
t a k e na sg i v e nb yt h el e a d e r .T h ew a g er a t e is also taken as given, assuming an
inﬁnitely elastic supply of labor. This gives rise to the following Bellman equations:









uY0 = 0 + {0
R&D eort of a rival
(Y1  Y0)+
z}|{




The equations in (2.11) can be explained in words: the annuity value at date w of
currently being a technological leader in an industry with gap q, uYq,e q u a l st h e





, plus the discounted
expected capital gain from making an innovation and thereby moving one further
step ahead of the follower, {q (Yq+1  Yq), plus the discounted expected capital loss
from having the follower catch up. The annuity value of a follower, uY3q,i se x p l a i n e d
similarly. In the Bellman equation for a neck-and-neck ﬁrm, the R&D eorts, {,o f
both ﬁrms are equal in symmetric Nash equilibrium, leaving both without a help
factor, k, and hence implying that each ﬁrm takes into account only its own R&D
cost in its investment decisions.
Each ﬁrm will choose its R&D eort to maximize its current annuity value. In
particular, the leader’s maximization problem is:
Yq =m a x
{
(






17The maximization problem can be derived similarly for Y0 and Y3q.T h u s e a c h
ﬁrm’s R&D eort is strictly proportional to the incremental value that follows from
innovating. Assuming the interior solution exists, the limiting value function of the
leader is dierentiable with respect to the leaders R&D eort, {q. This leads to the





















The obtained {q, {3q and {0 are the ﬂow innovation probabilities of, respectively,
the leader, the follower, and the neck-and-neck ﬁrm. Equations (2.11)(2.16) then
solve recursively for the sequence of {{q>{ 3q+1>Y q>Y 3q+1}qD0 =
2.4 One-step case
It has been argued that leaders have less incentive than followers to perform R&D.
In her controversial article Reinganum (1983) develops a non-deterministic R&D
game between two ﬁrms such that when an innovation is drastic (i.e. the innovator
will force the other producers out of the market) the leader will invest less in R&D
17The corner solutions can be ignored here because the incremental value of R&D is never
negative.
18As mentioned, it is assumed that the neck-and-neck ﬁrm takes the competitors R&D eort, {0,
as given while maximizing its own R&D eort. Therefore it can be ignored while dierentiating
wrt {0 for the neck-and-neck ﬁrm’s optimal R&D eort.
18than the follower, as the two ﬁrms are otherwise alike.19
AHHV discuss a special case where the size of the innovation, , is very large and
the leaders do not conduct R&D, which is in line with the assumptions of Reinganum
(1983). In this case, the length of a lead cannot be greater than one innovation.
AHHV show that when  $ 4, the equilibrium level of R&D eort of the leading
ﬁrm will approach zero. When  is very large, even a one-step lead would raise the
l e a d e r ’ sp r o ﬁ ta l m o s tt ot h em a x i m a ll e v e l(!(31>) ' 1 for   0)> and thus the
incentive to innovate would decrease. This greatly simpliﬁes the AHHV model and
allows the results to be derived analytically. The one-step case developed in the
remainder of this section is formulated by Aghion et al. (2002).20
In the one-step case, the maximum technological gap between leader and follower
in an industry is q =1 = In this case, the ﬁrm’s R&D eort is {q,w h e r eq 5 (1>0>1)
and the expected present value of the proﬁt is denoted Y0, Y1 and Y31 respectively
for a neck-and-neck ﬁrm, a leader and follower in an industry. The wage rate is
taken as given and normalized to unity ( = z =1 ) , assuming a perfectly elastic
labour supply. Taking into account the fact that the technological leader does not
invest in R&D in the one-step case, the above Bellman equations take the following
form:
uY1 = 1 + {31 (Y0  Y1)
uY0 = 0 + {0 (Y1  Y0)+{0 (Y31  Y0) 
({0)2
2 =
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(2.17)
Here it is worth recalling that the R&D eorts, {0 and {31,f o rt h en e c k - a n d - n e c k
ﬁrm and the follower respectively entail uncertainty (that follows a Poisson process).
The R&D process is stochastic and thus the R&D eort represents the probability
of a ﬁrm innovating. The dierence between the value functions (Y1  Y0) is the
19See Gilbert and Newbury (1982) for a deterministic case where the monopolist always innovates
before the entrant.
20Although AHHV (2001) formulate the case where the size of innovations is large, in this study
we refer to Aghion et al. (2002) when discussing the one-step case.
19dierence in proﬁt ﬂows between leader and neck-and-neck ﬁrm. The intuition
behind the value functions for the ﬁrms in each state is the following: the annuity
value for a leader, uY1, equals the current ﬂow of proﬁt, 1, plus the discounted
expected capital loss from being caught by the follower, {31 (Y0  Y1).T h ea n n u i t y
value of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm, uY0, equals the current ﬂow of proﬁt, 0,p l u st h e
discounted expected capital gain from making an innovation and thereby moving one
step ahead of the competitor, {0 (Y1  Y0), plus the discounted expected capital loss
from becoming a follower when the other ﬁrm innovates ﬁrst, {0 (Y31  Y0),m i n u s
the current R&D cost,
({0)2
2 . The annuity value of being a follower uY31,i st h e
current ﬂow of proﬁt, 31, plus the discounted expected capital gain from catching
up with the leader and thus becoming a neck-and-neck ﬁrm, {31 (Y0  Y31),m i n u s
the current R&D cost, ({2
31)
2 . Using the fact that each ﬁrm chooses its R&D eort
to maximize its current value, the following ﬁrst order conditions are obtained:
{0 = Y1  Y0





2.4.1 Equilibrium R&D intensities
The equilibrium R&D intensities can be derived using the information of the ﬁrst
order conditions in (2.18) and equation (2.17). It follows that the R&D eort of a
neck-and-neck ﬁrm, {0, and that of a follower, {31, can be solved. Eliminating the













These quadratic equations (2.19) and (2.20) can be easily solved for {0 and
{31 using the second degree quadratic equation solution and ignoring the negative
20solution. The obtained equations give the ﬂow innovation probabilities (or hazard
rates) of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm and follower, respectively:
{0 = u +
p
u2 +2( 1  0) (2.21)
{31 = (u + {0)+
q
u2 +( {0)
2 +2( 1  31)= (2.22)
When examining the eects of competition on the innovation probability in the
one-step case, Aghion et al. (2002) assume that a reduction in the neck-and-neck
proﬁts, 0, represents intensiﬁed product market competition.21 Aghion et al. (2002)
argue that the analysis and the results in the one-step case can be replicated para-
meterizing competition by the elasticity parameter, .

















2 +2( 1  31)
6
8 A 0= (2.24)
Equations (2.23) and (2.24)imply that intensiﬁed product market competition, as
characterized by a fall in the neck-and-neck proﬁts, 0, will lead to an increase in
the R&D eort of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm, {0= The follower will decrease its R&D
eort, {31, as the PMC is intensiﬁed. This opposing behavior of the neck-and-neck
ﬁrm and the follower, in regard to R&D eorts, resulting from intensiﬁed PMC, is
explained by two dierent eects.
As for the decrease in R&D eort of a follower, {31,A g h i o net al. (2002) argue
that this is the basic Schumpeterian eect at work, resulting from the reduced
prospective rent of the successful innovator, which manages to catch up with its
21For simplicity it is assumed that 1 and 1 are unaected by a change in competitiveness.
According to Aghion and Howitt (1998) the analysis remains essentially unmodiﬁed also for cases
where 1 is increased and 1 reduced by an increase in competition.
21rival. More intense competition induces a neck-and-neck ﬁrm to innovate, in order
to escape from competition. Thus, these ﬁrms increase their innovative activity,
so that {0 increases. This is because, as the dierence in proﬁts between being a
leader and being a neck-and-neck ﬁrm (1  0) increases (0 falls and 1 remains
unchanged), the incremental value of getting ahead increases with intensiﬁed PMC.
Aghion et al. (2002) refer to this eect as the escape from competition eect.T h e
sum of these eects is that the higher the fraction of neck-and-neck sectors in the
economy, the more positive the eect of intensiﬁed PMC on the average innovation
rate.
2.4.2 Competition and innovations
The aggregate eect of intensiﬁed product market competition on the steady-state
innovation rate is ambiguous, because of its dierent eects on industries in leveled
(neck-and-neck) and unleveled (leader-follower) states. The overall eect on average
productivity growth depends on the time a sector spends being neck-and-neck in
the steady-state. This is formulated by letting 1 and 0 respectively denote the
steady-state probability of being unleveled and leveled. During any unit time inter-
val an unleveled sector can become leveled with a steady-state probability, 1{31.
Furthermore, the probability of a leveled sector becoming unleveled is 20{0,w h i c h
is the aggregate probability of one of the ﬁrms innovating when both ﬁrms try to
escape competition. In the steady-state these two probabilities must be equal:
1{31 =2 0{0> (2.25)
since the fraction of sectors in each state must remain unchanged. Combining (2.25)
with the fact that the fractions of unleveled and leveled sectors sum up to one








and further the average rate of innovations:




Aghion et al. (2002) show by numerical simulations of the model, that the
relation between product market competition and the innovation rate, L, follows an
inverted-U shaped pattern.
Each industry follows a two-stage cycle in the one-step case with the frequency
of completed cycles being the fraction of time spent in the unleveled state, 1,t i m e s
the frequency of innovations in the unleveled state, {31. The output rises by factor
ln  with each completed cycle and hence the average growth rate of each industry
is 1{31 ln = From equation (2.26) it follows that the average growth rate of ﬁnal
output in the one-step case is:





To better understand the intuition behind the inverted-U shape, it is worthwhile
taking a closer look at how product market competition aects the average rate of
innovation in the AHHV model. This is easiest done by examining the eects of
intensiﬁed competition on the ﬁrm’s R&D eort and hence the overall R&D eort in
the industry. On the aggregate level, competition is assumed to aect the innovation
rate by determining the distribution of industries in leveled and unleveled states. In
other words, competition has a composition eect on the industries in the economy.
23When product market competition is close to zero, and hence the incremental
proﬁt of innovating is small for a neck-and-neck ﬁrm (0 is close to 1), there is little
incentive to innovate when the industry is leveled. Thus the overall innovation rate
will be highest when a sector is unleveled and there is asymmetric competition, and
the industry will be quick to leave the unleveled state (which it does as soon as the
follower innovates).
Since the industry leaves the leveled state slowly (that will not happen until
one of the neck-and-neck ﬁrms innovates), the industry will spend most of the time
in the leveled state, where the escape from the competition eect dominates ({0 is
decreasing in 0). In other words, if the degree of competition is initially low, an
increase will result in a faster average innovation rate.
At high degrees of competition, 0 is close to 31, so there is relatively little
incentive for the follower to innovate in an unleveled state.22 Thus the industry will
leave the unleveled state relatively slowly. Meanwhile the large incremental proﬁt,
1  0, gives ﬁrms in the leveled state relatively large incentives to innovate, and
hence the industry will be relatively quick to leave the leveled state. Consequently,
the industry will spend most of the time in the unleveled state, where the Schum-
peterian eect is at work on the follower, and the leader does not innovate in the
one-step case. In other words, when the degree of competition is initially very high,
an increase in PMC results instead in a lower average innovation rate.
From the analysis of how intensiﬁed competition aects the average innovation
rate, it follows that, when competition is initially low, intensiﬁed competition may
raise the rate of innovation through the escape from the competition eect on neck-
and-neck ﬁrms. When competition is already ﬁerce, the Schumpeterian eect may
decrease the innovation rate, by decreasing the followers’ incentive to innovate. Thus
22The follower still has some incentive to innovate even in cases where 0 = 1,b e c a u s e ,
although an innovation won’t raise current proﬁts, it will take the ﬁrm one step closer to the
possibility of becoming a leader and attaining 1=
24the inverted-U shaped pattern between competition and innovation results from the
interplay between the escape from competition and the Schumpeterian eects. The
reason why one eect is stronger for low degrees of competition, whereas the other
dominates for high degrees, is due to the composition eect on the steady state
distribution of leveled and unleveled industries.
The composition eect can be seen more clearly from the steady state distribution
of the fraction of industries in the leveled state and the unleveled state in equation
(2.26). When there is no competition (0 = 1), it is clear from equation (2.21)
that {0 =0 , and thus the industry is always leveled (0 =1in (2.26)). Under
perfect competition (0 = 31), (2.21) and (2.22) imply that neck-and-neck R&D
eorts will be larger than followers’ R&D eorts, {0 A{ 31.T h u s t h e o v e r a l l r a t e
of innovation is at least twice as high in the leveled state as in the unleveled state.
Hence the fraction of time 1 spent in the leveled state is less than 1
3 under perfect
competition.
At low levels of PMC, most sectors will be leveled, and the escape from compet-
ition eect dominates on average, whereas at high levels of PMC, most sectors will
be unleveled, and the Schumpeterian eect on followers’ R&D eorts dominates on
average. This in turn implies that intensiﬁed PMC will have a positive eect on
innovative activity at low initial levels of PMC and a negative eect at high initial
levels of PMC.
2.5 Competition, taxes and R&D
An interesting issue is the eect of taxes on innovation, and how taxes could function
as an incentive scheme by reducing the slack of the ﬁrms. In a case where ﬁrms pay
taxes and receive tax ﬁnanced R&D subsidies, the interplay between competition
and tax ﬁnanced subsidies seems to be complementary. The eect of competition
on innovations is likely to be reinforced by an increase in tax ﬁnanced subsidies,
25provided the distorting eect of taxes is su!ciently small. We will elaborate on these
considerations in the following subsection by introducing a corporate ad valorem tax
on proﬁts and wage subsidies for R&D activity into the framework of the AHHV
model. More speciﬁcally, the incentive eects of a wage subsidy for R&D activity
will be analyzed as well as how a subsidy interacts with competition.
For expositional simplicity, the analysis will follow the one-step case, where the
maximum sustainable gap is q =1 , and where there is no help factor for followers
(k =0 ).23 As in the AHHV model, we take the wage rate as given, with the implicit
assumption of an inﬁnitely elastic supply of labor at wage z =1 .A s a l r e a d y
discussed, these assumptions are restrictive in many ways, but they are helpful in
deriving some of the analytical equilibrium results of the model and understanding
important incentive eects shaping dynamically optimal R&D decisions of ﬁrms.
More formally, let  be an ad valorem tax levied on corporate proﬁts, and let 
denote a direct R&D subsidy which reduces the costs of innovating. The Bellman
equations for equilibrium R&D investments can then be written as
uY1 =( 1  )1 +( {31)(Y0  Y1)










In the above equations, 1   can be interpreted as the ﬁrm’s own share of its
R&D costs. By analogy to the basic one-step case, the ﬁrst order conditions for the
neck-and-neck ﬁrm and the follower are derived as
23See Aghion et al. (2001)
26CuY0
C{0
=( Y1  Y0)  (1  ){0 =0 (2.30)
CuY31
C{31
=( Y0  Y31)  (1  ){31 =0 = (2.31)
Consequently, the innovation probabilities of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm and the follower
are
{0 = u +
q¡
u2 +2( 1 )
31 (1  )(1  0)
¢
(2.32)
{31 = (u + {0)+
q¡
(u + {0)2 +2( 1 )




Substituting (2.32) into (2.33) we derive an alternative expression for {31:
{31 = (u + {0)+
q
u2 + {2
0 +2( 1 )
31 (1  )(1  31)= (2.34)




In other words, when neck-and-neck ﬁrms choose their R&D eort {0 optimally,
they only take into account their own R&D investment, as the rivals eort equals
{0 in a symmetric Markov equilibrium. Important strategic interaction, however,
arises from the fact that the innovative activity of the follower is aected by the










C{0 is negative, there is a strategic substitutability
between the innovative activity of the follower and that of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm:
27any factor that increases the innovative activity of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm, will de-
crease the innovative activity of the follower. Moreover, looking at
C{31
C{0 from a par-
tial equilibrium perspective, we can see that strategic substitutability is “strongest”
when the innovative activity of the neck-and-neck ﬁrm {0 is very small. In fact, it











This leads us to the conjecture that the impact of an R&D subsidy must crucially
depend upon the strength of strategic substitutability and the market structure.
More formally, this can be seen by analyzing the direct eects of tax ﬁnanced R&D
subsidies.
The direct eect of a tax ﬁnanced R&D subsidy on the probability of innovation





C(13).F r o m( 2 . 3 2 )i ti sc l e a rt h a t
C{0
C (1  )
? 0> (2.39)
for all realistic values of proﬁt tax, , and proﬁt dierence (1  0)= In other words,
an increase in the R&D subsidy will increase the R&D eort of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm
{0= In the case of the follower, however, the eect is more complicated, precisely

















28Given that the partial derivatives on the right hand side are of opposite sign, the
ﬁnal eect of a direct R&D subsidy remain ambiguous. After some tedious but











Condition (2.41) needs to be interpreted at the model’s equilibrium. It is solely an
implicit condition, given that the left hand side still depends upon proﬁts. However,
we can already draw some interesting conclusions regarding how R&D subsidies and
product market competition interact for dierent industries.
Firstly, at low degrees of product market competition (i.e. when 0 is close to 1),
the incremental proﬁt (1  0) approaches zero. There are hardly any incentives
to innovate in the leveled state, and consequently {0 $ 0. However, provided that
the incremental proﬁt of innovating for the follower is still large enough, a direct
R&D subsidy will have a positive eect on the follower’s innovating activity. This
is due to the fact that the left hand side of the equation (2.41) approaches inﬁnity
as leader and neck-and-neck proﬁts converge (1 $ 0)= It is thus more likely that
the inequality in (2.41) will hold.
On the contrary, when competition is quite intense, a follower’s incremental proﬁt
from innovating (0  31) is low as 0 $ 31. There is relatively little incentive
for the follower to innovate in an unleveled state. Moreover, we know from above
that the neck-and-neck R&D eorts will be larger than the follower’s R&D eorts,
i.e. {0 A{ 31, when product market competition is ﬁerce. Consequently, condition
(2.41) is less likely to hold and thus a direct R&D subsidy leads to a deterioration
of the follower’s R&D activity.
29The above analysis seems to suggest that R&D subsidy is likely to lead to a
desired increase in the R&D activity in those industries in which product market
competition is relatively muted. However, the overall eect of an R&D subsidy on
the average rate of innovation at dierent degrees of product market competition
depends on the steady state distribution of leveled and unleveled industries.
2.5.1 Average innovation rate with corporate tax and R&D subsidy
As already argued, the overall eect of an R&D subsidy on the average rate of in-
novation depends on the steady state distribution of leveled and unleveled industries
in the economy and naturally on the degree of competition in general.
Starting with the case where there is no competition at all (1 $ 0),w en o t i c e
from (2.32) that neck-and-neck ﬁrms no longer have incentive to innovate at all,
and hence {0 =0 = In the steady state equilibrium, all the industries are eventually
driven down to the neck-and-neck state, and thus all industries will eventually be
leveled, 0 =1 = Given that the average ﬂow of innovations is L = 1{31 +2 0{0> it
is clear that in the steady-state the average innovation rate is also eventually driven
down to zero. Consequently, at low degrees of competition, R&D subsidies turn out
to be completely ineective= A l t h o u g ht h ef o l l o w e r ’ si n n o v a t i v ea c t i v i t i e sc o u l d ,a t
low levels of PMC, be boosted by subsidies, their share in the economy eventually
approaches zero, and hence they have no impact on the average innovation rate.
Technological progress and economic growth both decline, regardless of how much
the ﬁrms are subsidized.
At high degrees of competition, both follower and neck-and-neck ﬁrms innovate
at positive rates:




{0 = u +
q¡
u2 +2( 1 )
31 (1  )(1  0)
¢
= (2.43)
30What is important to notice, however, is that the R&D subsidy aects the innovating
activity of the follower only to the extent that it aects the neck-and-neck ﬁrm, {0.












This implies that when competition is ﬁerce an increase in a direct R&D subsidy
leads to a deterioration of the innovative activity of the follower. This is due to the
strategic substitutability eect,
C{31
C{0 ? 0. Finally, making use of the average rate of
innovation in (2=27)> it can be shown that
CL
C{0
? 0> ; uA0>{ 0 A 0= (2.45)
In other words, in the case of perfect competition, an increase of innovative activ-
ity of neck-and-neck ﬁrms leads to a decline of the average ﬂow of innovations in
the economy. This is due to the fact that a strategic substitutability eect domin-
ates the positive eect of R&D subsidies on the neck-and-neck ﬁrms. Furthermore,
this means that any public subsidy on the costs of innovating will reduce the total
innovation ﬂow of the economy, regardless of how innovations actually are ﬁnanced.
Consequently, we have derived the two results which suggest that R&D subsidies
either have very little eect on the average innovation rate of the economy, or that
the eect is of the opposite sign from the expected. The two situations are however
analyzed in the extreme cases of no competition and perfect competition, which rep-
resent rather unrealistic situations, existing in their purest only forms in textbooks.
We thus turn our attention to the intermediate cases, which are essentially more
useful for practical predictions of the theory, as well as for its empirical validation.
312.5.2 A simulation exercise
Analytical results of the intermediate cases are hard to derive and we thus rely
here on simple numerical simulations, which enable us to examine the eects of a
tax ﬁnanced R&D subsidy on incentives to innovate in the world located between
monopoly and full competition. Figure 1 depicts the average innovation rate at
dierent degrees of competition as well as at dierent degrees of R&D subsidy.
The vertical axis measures the average innovation rate and the horizontal axis the
degree of competition. The degree of competition is measured by letting 0 increase
from 0 to 1=24 This gives an inverted-U shape relationship between average rate of
innovations and competition, just as in the original AHHV article. However, this
inverted-U shape relationship becomes steeper and reaches higher average rates of
innovation as R&D subsidies are increased. This points to the fact that there might
be complementarity between direct R&D subsidies and competition. Moreover,
it seems that the highest additionality would be achieved at moderate levels of
competition.
A numerical example, where u =0 =04, 31 =0 > 1 =5 >=0and  takes
the values 0> 0=1 and 0=5 ( in other words, respectively, a zero, 10 percent and
50 percent subsidy), gives an inverted-U shape relationship between competition
and innovations. This inverted-U shape relationship becomes steeper as the R&D
subsidies are increased, while at high and low levels of competition, R&D subsidies
do not aect the average innovation rate at all. This implies that direct R&D
subsidies and competition are complementary by nature.
When positive taxes are introduced into the simulation, the relationship contin-
ues to hold, as the taxes only reduce the complementarity between R&D subsidies
and product market competition.
24The values of the proﬁts should be interpreted as the price cost margin, in percent terms.



































Figure 1: Innovations, competition and a direct research and development subsidy.
2.6 Summary of theoretical predictions
The theoretical part of this study can be summarized as follows. In the Schum-
peterian growth model of Aghion et al. (2001) it is analytically shown that when
ﬁrms innovate ‘step-by-step’ and innovation follows a Poisson process, competition
may increase the incremental proﬁt from innovating and hence increase the incent-
ive to innovate. On the other hand, competition may reduce innovation incentives
for followers by reducing the prospective gains from catching up with the leader.
There are thus two eects at work aecting the innovation eort as a response to
changes in the competitive climate within the industry. Firstly, the increased post-
innovation rents relative to pre-innovation rents may due to intensiﬁed competition,
lead neck-and-neck ﬁrms to increase their R&D eorts, in other words, escape from
33competition. Secondly, as intensiﬁed competition decreases neck-and-neck proﬁts,
it may decrease the follower’s eort to catch up with the leader, which is in line
with the Schumpeterian reasoning of post-innovation rents being the driving force
of innovation.
On the aggregate level, the composition of leveled and unleveled industries in the
economy determines the ﬁnal ee c to fp r o d u c tm a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o no nt h er a t eo f
innovation. The relationship between product market competition and innovation
is shown to be of an inverted-U shape (this goes especially for the one-step case,
where innovations are large and no imitation is considered). With an extension to
the AHHV model, we come to the conclusion that a direct R&D subsidy ﬁnanced
by a corporate tax has little eect on innovation at extremely high and extremely
low degrees of competition. However, simulations of the intermediate case show that
the gains on direct R&D subsidies are achieved at moderate levels of competition,
where the escape from competition eect dominates and the majority of industries
are in the neck-and-neck state.
The theoretical part of this study gives rise to predictions that are worth explicit
statement before proceeding to test them empirically:
1. The AHHV model generates the prediction of an inverted-U shaped relation-
ship between product market competition and the average rate of innovations.
2. This inverted-U relationship can be strengthened by direct public R&D sub-
sidies. The results of our extension to the AHHV model suggest that there
exists a complementarity between product market competition and R&D sub-
sidies. Thus, the more direct R&D subsidies ﬁrms receive, the steeper the
positive eect of product market competition on innovation and the greater
the number of innovations.
The ﬁrst prediction is already tested in Aghion et al. (2002) using data on
UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. They found evidence of an
34inverted-U shape relationship between competition and innovation in their data. We
will use Finnish data, described in detail below, to test whether the same inverted-U
shape relationship holds in the Finnish data as well. Moreover, we will test whether
there exists a complementarity between R&D subsidies and competition, as stated
above.
353 Empirical issues of competition and innovation
We now turn to the empirical analysis, based on data on Finnish manufacturing
ﬁrms. First, we need to construct quantiﬁable measures for a ﬁrm’s innovative
output, the degree of product market competition, the size of the technology gap
between ﬁrms within an industry, and the R&D subsidy. The choice and construc-
tion of these measures is not trivial and thus deserve some speciﬁc attention, since
there are several dierent measures found for each in the literature. Therefore, this
section is speciﬁcally devoted to a discussion of the measurement issues.
3.1 Measuring innovation intensity
The search for accurate and applicable indicators for innovation intensity has attrac-
ted much attention lately in the empirical IO literature. Commonly used ﬁrm level
measures are R&D expenditures, patenting activity, innovation counts and total
factor productivity. Although R&D intensity is a standard measure for innovative
input as well as a proxy for innovative output the problem one often faces is that
R&D data have been poorly reported until recent years. Another problem that
arises when using R&D spending as a proxy for innovation intensity is related to
the dierential role of formal R&D.25 Especially in small ﬁrms a substantial part of
the R&D activity may be informal and hence unlikely to be reported. Thus, using
R&D spending as a proxy for innovative output might entail a downward bias. For
this reason, it is tempting to look for other measures of innovation, such as e.g.
patenting activity.
Patent data have been used in the economic analysis of technological change
since the pathbreaking analyses of Scherer (1965) and Schmookler (1966). The
computerization of patent statistics in the 1970s gave easier access to patent data and
25For a discussion of the problems related to R&D as an indicator for innovations, see Griliches
(1990).
36further stimulated econometric analysis using such data. Moreover, as information
on patent citations has become available in computerized form, the informational
content of patent data has notably increased.
Following Aghion et al. (2002), we use patents as the main indicator of innovative
activity.26 More speciﬁcally, we use information on patents granted by the United
States Patenting O!ce (USPTO) and originating in Finland. Since the USPTO is
the place where innovations are patented internationally, all major innovations are
patented in the U.S.. Thus, many low value patents are screened out by focusing
on USPTO patents.
3.1.1 Micro-level patent data
The patent system can be seen as an institutional devise to remedy a problem of non-
excludability of the innovation, in the sense that a patent is by deﬁnition a temporary
legal monopoly granted to investors for the commercial use of an invention. In
principle, in order to receive this right, the invention must satisfy the following
conditions:(l) the invention must be nontrivial, in the sense that it must not be
obvious to a skilled practitioner of the relevant technology, (ll) it must be useful in
such a way that it has a commercial value, and (lll) t h ep a t e n ta p p l i c a t i o nm u s t
relate to and identify “prior art”, the practice of which is necessarily excluded from
the property right granted by the patent.
If a patent is granted, an extensive public document is created. This document
contains detailed information about the invention, the inventor(s), the organization
to which the inventor assigns the patent property right (usually an employer), and
the technical antecedents of the invention. Thus, as Griliches (1990) points out, the
26Alternatively, there is a large number of innovation surveys available, though usually on the
domestic level only. An exception is the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) , which collects
countrywise information on signiﬁcant innovations in Europe. Also, in Finland, the Sﬁnno group
at the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) has collected data on signiﬁcant innovations of
economic or organizational importance to the companies. See Palmberg et al. (1999) for a detailed
description of the Sﬁnno database.
37patent system serves two purposes in encouraging invention and technical progress.
It does this by providing a temporary monopoly for the inventor and by creating
knowledge spillovers by forcing early disclosure of the innovation.
The so-called prior art that the patent relates to is identiﬁed by references or
citations. Prior art also includes previous patents and other previously published
material that identify aspects of the relevant publicly known technology. Thus,
along with the detailed description of the novelty of the innovation in the patent
claim, citations play an important role in delimiting the property right that the
patent application represents. The citations are not necessarily made before ﬁling
an application. A cited patent can also be identiﬁed via a search conducted by the
inventor’s patent attorney, or by the patent examiner who reviews the application
for the patent o!ce.
3.1.2 Patent citations
A patent application for a technological innovation explicitly identiﬁes other pat-
ents as constituting the technological “state-of-the-art” on which the present patent
builds. Thus patent citations may be seen as providing information on two major
aspects of innovation. The ﬁrst is the technological impact of individual patents.
Indeed, given the underlying heterogeneity in what is measured by a patent27,i n -
formation on citations received and made in patents is important for increasing the
applicability of patents as indicators of technological change. Using data on patent
citations, one can get an idea of the inﬂuence that an innovation has had on success-
ive innovations. The second aspect of innovation to which citation data contribute is
the study of knowledge spillovers. Citations enable quantitative analysis of linkages
between inventions, inventors and assignees over time and space. However, as Hall
et al. (2000) point out, one must bear in mind that there is a substantial amount of
27The technical and economic signiﬁcance of patents dier greatly. For a discussion, see Griliches
(1990).
38“noise” in patent citations data (due to the fact that citations may be made by dif-
ferent persons in several stages of a patent application process). Thus, one must be
careful in drawing inferences about spillovers solely from the analysis of citations.28
In particular, problems arise, according to Hall et al. (2003), when using citations
as evidence of spillovers or knowledge ﬂows from cited patents to citing inventors.
This is due to the fact that many of the citations are added by the inventor’s patent
attorney or the patent examiner, and may hence refer to inventions completely un-
known to the citing inventor. On the other hand, Hall et al. (2000) argue that, in
using citations to a patent as an indicator of the patent’s impact, or even economic
value, the citations that are identiﬁed by parties other than the citing inventor may
well be just as important as the ones made by the inventor of the patent in reﬂecting
“the size of the technological footprint” of the cited patent. In a detailed survey
of inventors, Jae et al. (2000) come to the conclusion that, qualitatively, one-half
of citations appear to correspond to some kind of impact of the cited innovation
on the citing inventor, and around one-quarter seem to correspond to a fairly rich
knowledge ﬂow, fairly signiﬁcant impact, or both.
T h ei m p a c to fc i t a t i o n so nt h ee c o n o m i cv a l u eo fap a t e n ti sar a t h e ru n e x -
plored area of research. Trajtenberg (1990) collected, in his seminal work on patent
citations, data on patents related to a class of medical instruments (computerized
tomography (CT) scanners), and related the ﬂow of patents over time to the estim-
ated social surplus created by improvements of CT scanners. When simple patent
counts were used, no correlation was found with the estimated surplus. However,
when citation-weighted patent counts were used, the correlation between welfare
improvements and patenting were extremely high, on the order of 0.5 or more. This
suggests that citations can be used as a measure of patent quality, as indicated by
28For an overview of interesting applications using patent-citations data, see Jae and Trajten-
berg (2002).
39the promotion of social welfare.29
3.1.3 Patent stocks and citation weighted patents
Given that patents receive dierent numbers of citations and these citations occur
over time, it is necessary to construct a some kind of weighting scheme for the
number of citations. A straightforward way, introduced by Trajtenberg (1990), is to
weight each patent l by the actual number of citations that it subsequently receives,
denoted by Fl. In this linear weighting scheme all patents and citations are assigned
a value of one. Using this measure one can construct an index of weighted patent




(1 + Fl)> (3.1)
where qw is the number of patents issued during year w in a given product class.
In this weighting scheme, it is assumed that a citation is worth as much as a
patent. However, in reality there may be increasing or decreasing returns to the
informational content of citations, in which case the weighting scheme would be
nonlinear. Trajtenberg (1990) also considers a more general speciﬁcation of citation
weighted patent counts. He ﬁnds that the marginal informational content of ZSFw
increases with the number of citations, which strengthens the potential role of ZSFw
as an indicator of the value of innovations. Other ﬁndings are that the variance in
the value of patents appears to be larger and the distribution of those values more
skewed than one would infer from a simple citation count.
Patents and citations have also been used by Hall et al. (2000) to calculate
the “book” value of knowledge capital owned by a ﬁrm. Patents are considered a
29Also Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997, 1999) ﬁnd in their studies that a patent quality measure
based on multiple indicators, such as citations, number of claims and number of dierent countries
in which the invention is patented, has signiﬁcant power in predicting which patent rights will be
renewed upon expiration and which will be litigated.
40more accurate proxy for knowledge capital than R&D expenditure because patents
better represent the success of an R&D programme. When using R&D expenditures
as a proxy for knowledge stock, it is implicitly assumed that each dollar spent on
research generates the same amount of knowledge capital. Thus, “dry holes”, i.e.
unsuccessful projects, are not separated from successful innovation-producing R&D,
which causes robustness problems in the measure. Although some of the patents
held by a ﬁrm might represent the same kind of dry holes30,H a l let al. (2000) argue
that the bias can be at least partially corrected for by constructing citation-weighted
patent stocks.31
When calculating a patent based proxy for knowledge stocks, it makes more
sense to use a stock measure rather than a ﬂow measure for knowledge. A stock
measure better captures the idea that beneﬁts from a patent are likely to persist
far into the future. We use the approach of Hall et al. (2003) and Bloom and Van
Reenen (2000) in computing the citation-weighted patent stock, using the perpetual
inventory method. More formally, we denote by F (w>) the number of citations in
year  to patents applied for in year w= Thus, the total number of citations to the





We calculate the citation stock using a standard declining balance formula; hence
the total citation stock observed in year w is
(Citation Stock)w =( 1 ) × (Citation Stock)w31 +( Citations)w = (3.3)
We assume that the knowledge depreciation rate, > is 30%, as in, e.g. Bloom and
30As mentioned above, the (ex post) value of patents is extremely skewed, with at least 1/4 of
the patents being completely worthless. See Pakes and Schankerman (1984) and Pakes (1986).
31See Hall et al. (2003) for a good explanation of how to construct citation weighted knowledge
stocks and related problems.
41V a nR e e n e n( 2 0 0 0 ) . 32 We follow their approach in using only the ﬁrst ﬁve years of
citations (after an application) to obtain a “ﬁve year cite stock”.33 This measure
has the actual advantage, compared to measures observing longer periods, that no
normalization is needed to deal with truncation bias. In order to avoid the problems
of truncation bias caused by taking into account only citations made until the end
of the observed period, we select our citation estimation period to run up to 1994
while our citing data runs up to 1999. Consequently, we have 5 years of observations
on citations for every patent. Bloom and Van Reenen (2000) show that this measure
correlates strongly with measures using a longer period of observation of citations
and normalized citations per patent.
As an alternative measure for impact corrected patent counts, we calculate the
normalized citation intensity for each patent. This measure attempts to improve
the comparability between patents of dierent grant years. Comparability between
patents of die r e n tg r a n ty e a r si sd i !cult due to the truncation bias, i.e. that we
only observe citations received up to the end of the period of observation. Another
problem that biases comparisons between numbers of received citations per patent
is citation inﬂation. In order to obtain a measure that is comparable across patents
of dierent grant years, we use the estimates by Hall et al. (2001) of the shape of the
citation-lag distribution in each technology ﬁeld, i.e. the fraction of lifetime (deﬁned
as the 30 years after the grant date) citations that are received in each year after the
patent is granted. This distribution is assumed to be stationary and independent
of the overall citation intensity and enables the estimation of total citations for a
patent in any technology ﬁeld for which a part of the citation period is observed.
We also remove the eects due to the changing propensity to cite. This is done
simply by dividing the observed sum of citations of a patent by the fraction of
32We also calculate the stock measure using the, perhaps more conventional, 15% depreciation
rate; see Hall et al. (2003).
































Figure 2: Citation Lag Distribution by Technological Field
the population that lies in the interval for which citations were observed and by
the citing year deﬂator. As Hall et al. (2000) point out, at least three years of
actual observations on citations should be available for each patent in order to be
able to estimate the lifetime citations accurately. For patents, for which a shorter
period is at hand, a problem arises due to the fact that few patents receive citations
during their ﬁrst years of patent life, leading to predictions of zero lifetime citations
for innovations that might be frequently cited a few years after patenting. Thus
estimates are likely to be noisy if only a short track of the patents “career” is
observed. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a citation lag at
3d i erent industries in Finland.
433.2 Measuring the degree of market power and product
market competition
In real world industries, one seldom ﬁnds all ﬁrms setting prices equal to the com-
petitive price level. In fact, most ﬁrms are expected to have some degree of market
power. In assessing the level of market power, the ﬁrst question to arise is which
theoretical measure of market power should be used. The second question, which
follows from the ﬁrst, is how to empirically operationalize the chosen measure.
Empirical studies typically use some measures of market concentration or proﬁt
margin as indicators of market power. Further, in some studies import penetration
is used as a proxy for the degree of foreign competition. As Ahn (2002) argues, these
measures are admittedly not accurate measures of competition. However, they are
relatively easily calculated and hence the most widely used:
• Concentration: A concentration ratio is often calculated as the combined out-
put share or employment share of the largest q ﬁrms in a market. One problem
with this measure is that it does not reﬂect the competitive pressures coming
from potential entrants originating in contestable markets. Another weakness
of the concentration measures is the di!culty of deﬁning actual market bound-
aries (both geographic and product boundaries), where competition occurs.
• Price-cost margin or mark-up: Measures of proﬁtability are often used as
measures of market power. In theory the price-cost margin is measured by the
Lerner index, deﬁned as the ratio of the ﬁrm’s mark-up (that is, the dierence
between the price sl and the marginal cost F0




index reﬂects the degree of monopolistic mark-up pricing above marginal cost.
Thus the index increases with the mark-up charged by the ﬁrm, which should
be the most desirable feature of any index of market power. However, as Motta
(2004) argues marginal cost is mainly a theoretical concept and is generally
44not observable even with the best knowledge of the technological conditions
in which the ﬁrm operates. In real world applications, the Lerner index is
commonly calculated as value of sales less payroll and material costs divided
by value of sales. In this calculation, average variable cost is used as a proxy
for marginal cost. Aside from the di!culties of measuring marginal costs,
another di!culty in direct application of the Lerner index is that monopolistic
ﬁrms are characterized by productive ine!ciency. Thus, a ﬁrm’s market power
is not always revealed by applying the Lerner index, as it has relatively high
costs (and hence relatively low margins), whereas such high costs might be the
result of its monopoly power.
• Import penetration: The ratio of imports to domestic production is often
used as a measure of foreign competition. In measuring the degree of product
market competition in a highly integrated international market, it might be
necessary to consider concentration in world markets rather than focusing on
domestic markets.
The intuition behind using a concentration ratio or a markup ratio to measure
competition is clear. In a market where the individual suppliers are inﬁnitesimally
small relative to market size, suppliers have no power to set prices above marginal
cost and hence the concentration ratio and price-cost margin will be zero in the ideal
case of perfect competition. On the other hand, in a monopolistic or oligopolistic
market, one or a few players are expected to use their market power and earn
proﬁts by charging prices above marginal cost. In this sense, one could say that the
concentration ratio and the mark-up ratio are closely correlated with the degree of
market power.
The measure of product market competition which is best suited for our empirical
analysis and which also avoids many of the problems of market power-based measures
45of competition is the Lerner index. We calculate this measure as
ol =
operating proﬁt
value of gross output
(3.4)
Operating proﬁts are calculated by deducting compensation to employees and
capital costs from the ﬁrm’s value added.34 The numerator in this operationalization
is thus more similar to price minus average cost than to price minus marginal cost.
By dividing the operating proﬁts by the value of gross output we then obtain a ﬁrm
speciﬁc Lerner index.
We then construct our industry level measure of the Lerner index. This is done
by classifying ﬁrms into industries by the two-digit SIC code in which the ﬁrms are

















where l is the ﬁrm index, m the industry index, and w the time index. Olw is the
number of total hours worked in the ﬁrm l in year w and is used to measure the
size of the ﬁrm. Note that we use 1 minus the Lerner, which gives us that a value
of 1 indicates perfect competition (price equals marginal cost) while values below 1
indicate some degree of market power.
Following Aghion et al. (2002), we construct an alternative measure for compet-
ition by removing the eect of market share on a ﬁrm’s proﬁt margin:
Dlw =
1  ollw
1  pvlw · ollw
= (3.6)
34As a measure of capital cost we use the implicit price index of the investments, calculated from
national accounts. Capital stock is measured using the perpetual inventory method and deﬂated
to 1995 prices.
35Note that we use 1 minus the Lerner, which gives us that a value of 1 indicates perfect
competition (price equals marginal cost) while values below 1 indicate some degree of market
power.
46Market share is measured as the ﬁrm’s share of output produced by ﬁrms in the same










Dlw · Olw= (3.7)
Figure 3 shows the 1-Lerner Index and market share adjusted index ()f o rs o m e
two-digit level industries in Finland in 1985-2001. As a general observation, one
can see that in almost all 2-digit industries, the industry level Lerner index suggests
that competition has increased in 1985-2000. Moreover, the ﬁgure shows that after
removing the eect of market share on ﬁrm’s proﬁt margin, a general view on the
level and development of competition at dierent industries remains largely the
same.
3.3 Productivity as a technology measure
Productivity indicators are often used as measures of technological change and tech-
nological dierences across plants at a given point of time (Maliranta, 2003). This is
legitimately done, assuming that each unit maximizes its proﬁts and hence minim-
izes its costs, leaving no resources unexploited. This calls for addressing two issues.
First, how well do productivity measures, such as standard total factor productivity
(TFP), reﬂect technological change and, second, can the evenness of the technolo-
gical distribution within an industry be used as a measure of competitive pressure
within the industry. The second question depends largely on how dierences across
plants within an industry are measured, since there are many ways to capture the
distribution of technological levels. Let us brieﬂy take up the ﬁrst question before
returning to the second one.
36Note that here we use the superscript z to indicate that a measure is weighted by the number
of employees. For simplicity, we drop the superscripts in reporting the empirical results and use
only fmw and mw=
47Figure 3: Degree of competition as measured by 1- Lerner index and market share
adjusted index in 12 Finnish industries (here indexed by their two-digit SIC code,
see Table 2 for the corresponding names.).
In the presence of imperfectly competitive product markets the standard TFP
measures tend to be biased. For this reason these measures serve at best as rough
measures of technological change= Furthermore, as Leiberstein (1966) argues, the
dierences in X-ine!ciency might also cause bias in the TFP measures. This means
that units similar in all relevant aspects have dierent productivity due to dierences
in X-ine!ciency. It is di!cult to draw a sharp distinction between a relatively low
technological level and X-ine!ciency. This holds especially in cases where technology
is given a broad interpretation, e.g. when managerial skills are included in the
concept.
48The technological similarities within an industry are closely related to competi-
tion. If the ﬁrms are technologically close to each other (i.e. the industry is neck-
and-neck), the whole industry is expected to innovate more on the aggregate level,
as discussed in section 2.4.3. Measuring the technology gap, i.e. the distribution of
technology levels between ﬁrms, is often done by calculating the proportional dis-
tance a ﬁrm is from the industry’s technological frontier and calculating the average
distance across all ﬁrms in the industry.37
The ﬁrst problem one faces when constructing this measure is the X-ine!ciency,
as mentioned above. X-ine!ciency causes harm also when deﬁning technological
levels in the sense that some ﬁrms, even though technologically advanced, contain
“fat” (see Borenstein and Farrell, 1999), i.e., ine!ciency that is not inevitable (e.g.
poor management that causes the ﬁrm to perform on a lower productivity level than
other ﬁrms using the same technology). Such ine!ciency can usually be reduced by
internal adjustments instead of technological progress.
The second problem is that the most productive ﬁrm in the industry is usually
represented by an outlier. In this case, a ﬁrm with an exceptionally large technolo-
gical advantage over the second most productive ﬁrm in the industry might give a
false picture of the actual technology gap. More accurate and robust measures for
technology gap can be found by deﬁning the technology frontier as the mean of a
set of the most productive companies in the industry and calculating the technolo-
gical distance of the ﬁrms from this mean or by calculating industry level standard
deviation measures. The standard deviation measures, however, might also give a
false picture when productivity distribution is heavily skewed.
Consequently, in order to approximate technology gaps within each industry and
avoid at least partially the above mentioned problems, we calculate the distance
between the productivity of level of the third quarter and that of the ﬁrst quarter
37See e.g. Aghion et al. (2002).
49in the industry. In other words, we calculate the distance between the productivity
level of the companies at the 75th percentile in the productivity distribution and
the productivity level of the companies at the 25th percentile.
3.3.1 Measuring public funding
In general, all public funding that removes market imperfections and creates addi-
tionality in research should be considered as R&D subsidies.38 However, since our
theoretical measure of an R&D subsidy is most closely related to a wage subsidy,
we chose to consider only direct R&D subsidies. We thus use data on the ﬁnancing
decisions of subsidies granted to product development by the National Technology
Agency of Finland (Tekes). More speciﬁcally, we measure direct R&D funding as
Tekes direct subsidies for product development.
Tekes provides funding and know-how for R&D projects at companies registered
in Finland, Finnish research institutes and universities, and promotes national and
international networking. In 2003 Tekes received 28.1% of the total government
expenditures on R&D, i.e. EUR 407.2 million, which was roughly 8 % of total R&D
in Finland that year (total R&D in Finland in 2003 was EUR 4.8 billion).39 The
main instruments of Tekes are industrial R&D grants and loans to ﬁrms (roughly
60% of the funding is directed to the industry) as well as grants awarded to public
organizations for applied technical research. Of Tekes’ total budget, roughly 80% is
spent on direct subsidies (i.e. not repayable grants) for product development and
research projects and 20% is directed to loans for applied technological research and
product development (i.e. repayable loans priced at below-market interest rates).
Direct R&D subsidies form the cornerstone of Tekes’ funding (roughly 40% of the
total budget) along with the other type of direct subsidy, grants for research projects.
38See Hyytinen and Toivanen (2002) for a discussion of measures of government funding of R&D.
39For a detailed report on the allocation of public R&D expenditures in Finland for 2003, see
the report on the Government R&D funding in the state budget for 2004, compiled by Statistics
Finland.
50However, grants for research projects are mainly directed at universities and research
institutes and would thus not contribute much to our analysis even if considered.
Since the founding of Tekes in 1982, its role in the national innovation system
has increased steadily and direct subsidies have become the main form of ﬁnancing.
An increasing part of the funding is directed at SMEs40 which got roughly 60%
of industry funding in 2001. Also joint instruments for seed and start-up funding
have been developed in cooperation with the Finnish National Fund for Research and
Development (Sitra), and agencies that support the commercialization of innovations
(such as Finpro, a service organization aimed at internationalization of Finnish
ﬁrms) now play a larger role in the new technology programmes of Tekes.41 Tekes
can provide SMEs with R&D grants of up to 35% of total project ﬁnance and R&D
loans of up 70% of the predicted costs of a project. These ﬁgures are lower for large
companies, and ﬁnance is granted only on condition of some degree of networking
or other cooperation.
40The conclusions of an independent evaluation of Tekes by Zegweld and Guillaume (1995)
suggested that the SMEs should be more actively included in the sphere of inﬂuence.
41For an analysis of cooperation between organizations contributing to the Finnish innovation
system, see Gergiou et al. (2003).
514 The data
We construct our data set using data on the ﬁnancing decisions of Tekes, the com-
pany register at the Business Structures Unit (BSU) of Statistics Finland, the R&D
panel data of the BSU, a patent data set constructed by combining data drawn
from the National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland (NBPR) and the
so-called NBER patent citations ﬁle42, documented in more detail below, and the
BSU’s longitudinal plant level data on Finnish ﬁrms. As the base population, we
use the register of ﬁnancing decisions of Tekes. The “grant” data comprise 8 493
observations between 1985 and 2002 (one observation being the amount received
per ﬁrm per year) of 4 084 dierent ﬁrms. Since we restrict the analysis to man-
ufacturing industries, we are only able to match a subset of the entire grant data
to our industry level measures. Concentrating on ﬁrms which have received grants
for R&D is expected to screen out the ﬁrms conducting unsuccessful R&D, since
it is assumed that evaluators of grant applications of the technology agency make
assessments of the feasibility of the R&D projects. Another advantage of using the
grant data as the base population is that we reduce the problem of excess zeros of
the dependent variable, the U.S.patents, since the ﬁrms applying for R&D subsidies
a r ee x p e c t e dt oc o n d u c tm o r eR & Dt h a nt h ea v e r a g eﬁ r m . W em a t c ht h eg r a n t
data with the company register comprising data on all registered ﬁrms for each year
between 1988 and 2001.
We are able to match 6 763 observations to the company register, from which
we obtain the industry classiﬁcation of the companies. As mentioned above, we
classify ﬁrms by their two-digit SIC code and acknowledge the problems related to
business demographic issues such as mergers, acquisitions and exits. These problems
are partly avoided due to the fact that our base population is the grant register of
42The matching of NBPR and NBER patent data ﬁles enables the analysis of citations to USPTO
patents originating in Finland. In this sense, our data set consists of valuable information on
patents not previously applied to Finnish data.
52Tekes, which has attempted to follow up the ﬁnancing history of each ﬁrm and
hence has kept the original SIC code in most cases of mergers and acquisitions. We
match with our data the patenting information from the NBER patent citations
data ﬁle containing information on all U.S. patents originating in Finland between
1963-1999. We ﬁnd that 464 ﬁrms took out 2 534 U.S.patents during the period
1985-1999. We also match information on R&D expenditures from an R&D panel
based on an extensive R&D survey of Finnish companies between 1987-2001.43
Our competition measures and technology gap measures are calculated using a
plant-level panel data set constructed especially for research purposes.44 It is based
on the annual Industrial Statistics surveys that cover essentially all Finnish manu-
facturing plants employing at least 5 persons, up to year 1994, and from 1995 on
plants owned by ﬁrms that employ no less than 20 persons. We match this informa-
tion to a subset of our data set comprising only the companies in the manufacturing
industries. We exclude the observations with more than 50 patents per year and ex-
clude from our data outliers with respect to the competition measure. Finally, after
excluding the industries without any U.S. patents during the period of observation
our data comprises 3 247 observations of 1 517 manufacturing companies.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 1 and 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample of 3 247 observations.
Firstly, it is easy to see that our patent count distribution is highly skewed,
with the majority of the ﬁrms taking out no patents in any given year.45 The
mean of the industry level Lerner index is 0.077, implying that the ﬁrm’s average
price-cost margin is roughly 8%. The ﬁgure is surprisingly similar to that found in
43The R&D ﬁgures are collected by Statistics Finland in a survey which ﬁrms are obliged to
answer. Until 1994 this survey was done every other year.
44We use the entire sample of the plant-level data set in constructing the industry level compet-
ition and technology gap measures.
45See Table 1 for a distribution of ﬁrms by total patents.
53N Mean Std Median Min Max
U.S.Patents 3247 0.39 2.67 0 0 50
EPO Patents 3247 0.80 8.10 0 0 214
Domestic Patents 3247 2.03 12.95 0 0 317
Lerner index 3247 0.077 0.05 0.071 -0.08 0.27
Technology gap 3247 0.71 0.24 0.66 0.18 1.61
R and D expenditure (MEUR) 1872 3.23 16.0 0.347 0 572.8
O w nRa n dDe x p e n d i t u r e( M E U R ) 1 2015 2.83 12.2 0.313 0 398.9
R and D subsidies (EUR 1000) 3247 206.1 489.4 67.3 -134.5 8535.4
Subsidy/Inhouse R and D 1740 0.54 1.34 0.235 -0.49 38.2
Employment 3247 439 1249 55 0 16228
Observations per ﬁrm 3247 3.8 3.09 3 1 15
Sales (MEUR) 3247 104.4 489.5 6.5 0 8220.0
R and D/Sales 2011 0.278 2.7 0.026 0 86.1
1R and D data for a subset of 2015 observations
Employment is the number of employees
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Aghion et al. (2002). Our measure of the technology gap also has a large variation
ranging from industries in which leaders and followers have similar technologies, and
hence similar levels of total factor productivity (TFP), to industries where the most
productive quarter is 160% more productive than the least productive one. Also
it can be seen that in Finland, Information and telecommunications sector have
produced the largest amount of patents. The second largest industry producing
patents is Mechanical engineering, but there seems to be also relatively large number
of patents produced in Chemicals industry.
The average ﬁrm sales per year of roughly 104 million EUR against the median
of 6.5 million indicates that the data are severely skewed with respect to ﬁrm size.
Also the employment ﬁgures give an indication of a highly skewed distribution of
size of ﬁrms in our sample, with roughly 439 workers in the average ﬁrm while
the median ﬁrm has 55 workers. The average in-house R&D investment for a ﬁrm
is EUR 2.8 million, although there is wide variation within the sample, also in
terms of this ﬁgure; the median yearly investment on R&D is roughly a tenth of
the mean and the maximum observation is EUR 572 million. The average R&D
54Industry Average ﬁrm level Average number of Total sum of
N Lerner index annual U.S.Patents U.S. Patents
1516 Food manufacture, beverages 242 0.028 2.3 30
and tobaccoW
1719 Textile and leather industryWW 133 0.059 0.9 11
20 Wood products 213 0.034 0.5 6
21 Paper and pulp industry 83 0.056 0.7 9
23 Mineral oil processing 13 0.06 2.9 38
24 Chemicals 206 0.102 16.8 219
25 Rubber and plastic products 156 0.062 0.7 9
26 Non metallic mineral products 173 0.077 0.9 12
27 Metal manufacturing 105 0.034 2.7 35
28 Manufacture of metal goods 346 0.065 3.5 45
29 Mechanical engineering 688 0.067 20.5 267
31 Electrical and electronic engineering 191 0.111 3 39
32 Information and telecommunication 225 0.184 29.8 388
33 Instrument engineering 350 0.128 11.2 145
34 Motor vehicles 56 0.047 0.2 2
35 Manufacture of other vehicles 67 -0.015 1.2 15
Total 3247 0.068 6.1 1270
WThe tobacco industry (16) is combined with food and beverages manufacture (15).
WWThe textiles (17) and leather industry (18) are combined.
Table 2: Distribution of observations with patents and R and D intensity data by
industry
subsidy (i.e. direct subsidy by Tekes to industry R&D) is EUR 206 000 and quite
naturally, following from the distribution of R&D expenditures, this ﬁgure is also
skewed with the median yearly subsidy being EUR 67 300.46 The median of the
relative R&D subsidy is roughly 23% of a ﬁrm’s in-house R&D investments. The
unusually high mean of relative R&D subsidies is perhaps explained by the fact
t h a ts o m eﬁ r m sh a v eb e e nu n a b l et oc o m m i tt h e m s e l v e st os p e n d i n ga l l o c a t e dR & D
shares reported in grant applications.47 The weighted average of relative R&D
subsidies by industry per year is 0.17 and the corresponding median is 0.11.48 The
median share of R&D expenditures per sales is 2.6%. This ﬁgure seems rather small
taking into consideration that the ﬁrms in our data (i.e. all the manufacturing ﬁrms
receiving direct R&D subsidies by Tekes between 1985-2001) are assumed to conduct
more R&D than the average ﬁrm.
Tables 3 and 4 give more detailed ﬁgures on R&D spending and subsidies in Fin-
46The minimum R&D subsidy in the sample is a negative ﬁgure due to the fact that ﬁrms are
obliged to refound the grant in case of neglecting the contract terms.
47As mentioned above, Tekes funding contribution should not exceed 50% of the budget.
48We further see that in 506 observations the ratio of Subsidy/ Inhouse R&D expenditures was
above 0.5, i.e. over 50% of the in-house R&D is ﬁnanced by R&D expenditures.
55Total subsidies Direct industry Direct research Loans
and loans R and D subsidies funding
1985 52 21 13 19
1986 63 22 16 25
1987 69 25 21 23
1988 89 27 28 34
1989 100 39 31 30
1990 120 41 38 42
1991 145 58 44 43
1992 171 65 55 51
1993 238 114 75 49
1994 236 110 78 48
1995 259 132 86 41
1996 232 109 89 35
1997 331 137 132 63
1998 361 146 140 74
1999 400 168 153 79
2000 373 154 140 79
2001 387 160 146 81
Table 3: Tekes funding in the state budget, M EUR
land. From these we see that as public aid to R&D has increased heavily since 1985,
so has also business R&D investment. It is naturally hard to detect the causality
between private and public increases in R&D expenditures. One can however see
that the rate of increase of R&D subsidies is lagging slightly behind that of R&D
expenditures, increasing the relative importance of business R&D. From Table 4 we
can see that the companies in our sample represent a large share of the yearly do-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































&Patents 1o rm o r e 5o rm o r e 10 or more 30 or more 100 or more
Firms 967 135 72 27 11
Table 5: Distribution of ﬁrms by total patents 1968-1996
4.1.1 USPTO Patents data set
As mentioned above, we use the NBER patent citations data ﬁle developed by the
NBER group (Hall, Jae, Trajtenberg etc.) of innovation and productivity research-
ers.49 The original data comprise detailed information on almost 3 million U.S.
patents granted between January 1963 and December 1999, all the citations made
to these patents between 1975 and 1999 (over 16 million) and a variety of original
measures constructed using citation data, such as backward and forward citation
lags. The main technological categories of patents are Computers and Communic-
ations, Drugs and Medical, Electrical and Electronics, Chemical, Mechanical, and
Others. The complete data base is available on the NBER web site.
We restrict our attention to patents granted by Finnish companies. The data
base contains 6 429 patents originating in Finland, of which 5 435 are assigned to (967
dierent) companies. The rest of the patents are assigned to either individuals, the
government, or non-governmental institutions. As Table 5 shows, most companies
very rarely take out patents at the USPTO, while only one percent of the companies
have taken out more than 100 patents during the period of observation.
The patenting activity has steadily increased since the beginning of the 1970s,
a sc a nb es e e nf r o mF i g u r e4 ,w h e r et h et o t a ln u m b e ro fp a t e n t sa r eg r a p h e db y
year of application. In Figure 5 the same statistics are graphed by technological
ﬁeld. As expected the patenting activity has increased most rapidly in the ﬁeld of
computer and communication technology, but there has also been steady increases
in the other ﬁelds, especially in mechanical engineering and in chemical industry.
































































Chem Computer & Communication Drugs & Medical Electrical & Electronic Mechanical Others
Figure 5: Number of patents by year of application in dierent industries
Notice that the rapid decline in the number of applications in the latter part
of the period is due to the truncation problem. Because statistics are collected
only on patents granted, the nearly two year average application-grant lag causes a
downward bias toward the end of the period.
We also use the data on citations made by any of the 3 million patents in the main
data set to the 6 429 patents in our sample. The total number of citations received
by the Finnish patents in our sample is 20 058, while the total number of citations
made by the patents in our data is 40 505. As discussed above, it is assumed that
t h o s ep a t e n t st h a ta r ef r e q u e n t l yc i t e da r el i k e l yt ob em o r ep r o d u c t i v ea n dt h u s
more valuable to the ﬁrm. In Figure 6 we plot a histogram of the lag between a
patent being taken out and the subsequent citations to it. It is worth noticing that
even more than 20 year old patents receive citations, implying that some innovations



























Figure 6: Lag from patenting to citation
From the distribution of the backward lag of citation in Figure 7 we see that it
is skewed to the left, since most of the citations refer to recent patents in the same
technological ﬁeld.50 In Figure 8 we plot a histogram of cites per patent received.
From the histogram it is clear that many patents never receive any citations and
quite few are successful in stimulating further research along the same technological
trajectory.
Finally, in order to make use of the data on patents originating in Finland in
the NBER data ﬁle we need to match them to a patent data base (containing
only data on patent numbers, grant years, and company SIC codes) at Statistics
50The mean backward citation lag is 9.3 years and the median is 7 years. The oldest backward
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Figure 8: Histogram of a number of citations received per patent
62Finland, comprising all patents taken out by Finnish companies between 1985-2001.
This information was originally received from the National Board of Patents and
Registration of Finland (NBPR) and compiled at Statistics Finland into a functional
data set that enables matching. We ﬁnd that for the period of observation these
two data sets are matched completely except for two patents in the NBPR data that
were not found in the NBER data ﬁle.
635 Econometric methods
Following our theoretical model, our primary interest is to next ﬁnd out whether
there exists a nonlinear relationship between product market competition and the
innovation rate, in particular, whether it is of an inverted-U shape. We further want
to test our prediction of the interaction between competition and R&D subsidies.
We begin with the functional relationship which relates innovations, Llmw,t ot h e









where l indexes ﬁrms, m industries and w time. As discussed above, we measure an
increase in product market competition as an increase in product substitutability,
, which in turn is reﬂected in a decrease in the Lerner index. Hence a reduction
in the Lerner index is associated with a higher value of  a n dt h u sm o r ei n t e n s e
competition. Furthermore, our dependent variable, Llmw, is a count of patents which
has a skewed distribution and contains many zeros. The natural estimator for this
type of data is a Poisson model. We will also make use of other methods, such as
Kernel estimation and spline estimation in order to adopt more ﬂexible functional
forms.
5.1 Poisson regression
Our analysis follows that of Aghion et al. (2002) in that we use a log-linear regression
model and a basic quadratic speciﬁcation. We use patent counts as a proxy for
innovative eort and are thus referred to count data models. We suppose that
the patent process, i.e. our discrete random variable s, is Poisson distributed with
hazard rate q = hj(f)> where f is the measure of competition. In this case, the
64resulting count of patents, s,w i l li na n yt i m ei n t e r v a lh a v et h ed e n s i t y
Pr[s = | | f]=
hj(f)|h3hj(f)
|!
>| =0 >1>2>===> (5.2)
i.e. s,g i v e nf, is Poisson distributed with the density in (5.2)= In the log-linear
version of the model the expected number of patents can be written as
H [s | f]=h
j(f)= (5.3)
In this case, the Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimator provides a consistent estim-
ator for the expected number of patents. However, we acknowledge the fact that our
patent counts data are excessively dispersed, as is usually the problem with patent
data sets. This leads to an incorrectly estimated variance covariance matrix. Estim-
ated standard errors can however be corrected by using heteroscedasticity-corrected
standard errors, as suggested by Blundell et al. (1999).
In the estimation, we use ﬁrm level data on patent counts, since we are interested
in the performance of the individual ﬁrm, and industry level data on competition,
since we want to measure the overall competitive pressure within the industry. The
ﬁrms l =1 >===>Qw in our data are thus grouped into M mutually exclusive industries
with l 5 Lm and m =1 >===>M= We observe ﬁrms for w =1 >=====>Wl periods. Following
from the speciﬁcation of the conditional mean (5.3)> we write
H [slw | fmw]=h
j(fmw)= (5.4)
It is likely that the dierences in patenting activity between technology ﬁelds are
due to institutional features of the industries unrelated to product market compet-
ition. This will cause spurious correlation unless controlled for the industry ﬁxed
eects. We also include time eects to remove common macroeconomic shocks.
65Thus, when industry within eects and time eects are included, average patent
behavior is related to industry competition according to




where the {lw represent a complete set of time and industry dummy variables.
We also include the industry level technology gap measure in the quadratic spe-
ciﬁcation in order to capture the degree of neck-and-neckness of the industries. As
mentioned above, the innovation incentives, and hence the reactions to changes in
competitive climate, depend on the degree of neck-and-neckness in the industries (i.e.
how close the rivals are in cost/technology space). When including our technology
gap measure, QQmw> in the speciﬁcation we get




Since we are interested in allowing our data to determine the shape of the rela-
tionship between innovation and product market competition, we adopt a ﬂexible
speciﬁcation for j(f) and use nonparametric methods51. However, following Aghion
et al. (2002), we also estimate the model where j(f) is approximated with a quad-
ratic speciﬁcation.
Finally, in order to test for complementarity between product market competition
and R&D subsidies, we allow the inverted-U relationship to become steeper as the
R&D subsidies are increased. To analyze this interaction between competition and
R&D subsidies we include an interaction term in the quadratic speciﬁcation. We
thus acquire a quadratic speciﬁcation of the form where competition fmw is multiplied
by the relative R&D subsidies (direct industry R&D subsidies per inhouse R&D
51See Appendix B for a closer description of the non-parametric methods used in this study.
66expenditures), :








The theoretical predictions of an inverted-U shape imply that the sign of the
coe!cient 1 in the quadratic speciﬁcation (5.7) should be signiﬁcantly positive
and that the constants  and 2 should be signiﬁcantly negative, in order to turn
the curve into an inverted-U shape. Predictions of the interaction terms are more
ambiguous, based on our theory. However, our theory of the interaction between
competition and R&D subsidies suggests that 5 is signiﬁcantly positive.
676R e s u l t s
6.1 The inverted-U relationship
Regressions using the exponential quadratic speciﬁcation and without other control
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1-Lerner index
Figure 9: Basic quadratic speciﬁcation using simple patent counts
We can see from the ﬁgure and the estimated coe!cients that the exponential
quadratic speciﬁcation shows a clear inverted-U relationship. This relationship is
retained, although not as pronounced, when industry and time eects are included.
Using market share adjusted competition measure as constructed in equation (3.7),
the results remain qualitatively the same (see Table 7.)
68Dependent variable:
Simple patent counts
Observations 3174 3174 3174
Constant -46.80WW -87.47WW -5.92
s.e. (6=03) (7=41) (9=26)
fmw 116.39WW 194.31WW 16.79
s.e. (13=84) (16=98) (20=83)
f2
mw -72.35WW -109.51WW -11.89
s.e. (7=9) (9=67) (11=72)
Industry eects - yes yes
Time eects - - yes
Implication for an
inverted-U relationship yes yes no
** = signiﬁcant at 1% level
*=s i g n i ﬁ c a n ta t5 %l e v e l
We use the same notation for signiﬁcance levels of
coe!cients in all tables
Table 6: Regression with basic exponential quadratic speciﬁcation
We alternatively use, as dependent variable, the citation weighted patent counts
constructed using the formula in (3.1)= We can see from the ﬁrst column in Table
8 that the inverted-U relationship also holds for this measure. Including the in-
dustry ﬁxed eects in column 2 makes the relationship more pronounced while the
relationship does not hold when time eects are also included.
When using the estimated lifetime citations as dependent variable in the expo-
nential quadratic speciﬁcation our results are ambiguous, as reported in Table 9.
W i t h o u tt i m ea n di n d u s t r ye ects, the coe!cients produce a normal U-shaped re-
lationship between competition and innovation, with the innovation rate being the
highest at extremely high and extremely low levels of competition.
When time and industry eects are included, we get a weak inverted-U relation-
ship. Estimations using the other impact corrected measure for innovation, i.e. the
5-year cite stock calculated as in (3.3), are presented in Table 10. We see that the
inverted-U relationship is not robust to this impact corrected innovation measure.
We can see from the highly signiﬁcant coe!cients that a clear U-shaped relationship
69Dependent variable:
Simple patent counts
Observations 3174 3174 3174
Constant -43.92WW -101.45WW -14.32
s.e. (7=76) (9=91) (11=32)
mw 108.96WW 223.63WW 34.76
s.e. (17=51) (22=39) (25=24)
2
mw -67.6WW -124.86WW -21.50
s.e. (9=87) (12=57) (14=06)
Industry eects - yes yes
Time eects - - yes
Implication for an
inverted-U relationship yes yes
Table 7: Basic quadratic speciﬁcation using alpha as explanatory variable
Dependent variable:
Simple citation weighted patent counts
Observations 3174 3174 3174
Constant -53.52WW -103.33WW 13.03W
s.e. (3=35) (3=91) (5=55)
fmw 139.99WW 237.21WW -15.36
s.e. (7=81) (9=11) (12=52)
f2
mw -88.88WW -135.43WW 3.08
s.e. (4=52) (5=26) (7=08)
Industry eects - yes yes
Time eects - - yes
Implication for an
inverted-U relationship yes yes no
Table 8: Regression with basic exponential quadratic speciﬁcation
is attained between competition and innovations.
The quadratic speciﬁcation of an inverted-U shape might be incorrect, leading to
ambiguous results, as discussed above. Nonparametric methods however allow more
ﬂexible speciﬁcation. We therefore make use of the smoothing methods discussed
more in detail in appendix B, in order to capture the relationship between product











Industry eects yes yes
Time eects - yes
Implication for an
inverted-U relationship no yes
Table 9: Basic quadratic speciﬁcation using estimated total of lifetime citations as
dependent variable
able and both a quadratic spline regression52 and kernel estimation53, we ﬁnd that
the relationship between citation weighted patent counts and our measure of com-
petition takes a quite dierent form than predicted by the theory. Namely, from
Figure 10 we can see that estimating a Poisson model with a quadratic spline, we
attain a two peaked ﬁt.
The peak at lower levels of competition is arguably a phenomenon that one
cannot describe using the simple causal relationship between competition and in-
novation. The levels of competition are in this case essentially too low for a change
to have any eect on the incentives to innovate. Turning to the second local max-
imum, we can see that it is roughly at Lerner values of 0.05, with the ﬁt rapidly
decreasing moving toward zero proﬁt levels. It is striking that this local maximum
coincides almost without exception with the local maximum of the regression splines
in Aghion et al. (2002). We are tempted to explain this second peak with the theory
behind the inverted-U shape. Thus, for exceptional proﬁt margins, the escape from
competition eect does poorly in describing changes in innovation eorts. How-
52We use 8 evenly spaced knot points between 0.75 and 1.10.
53We use a Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.025.
71Dependent variable:
5-year cite stock
Observations 886 886 886
Constant 46.79WW 43.13WW 20.11WW
s.e. (2=05) (3=10) (4=33)
fmw -87.90WW -92.63WW -35.26WW
s.e. (4=69) (6=98) (9=81)
f2
mw 42.79WW 51.17WW 15.24WW
s.e. (2=68) (3=92) (5=58)
Industry eects - yes yes
Time eects - - yes
Implication for an
inverted-U relationship no no no
Table 10: Basic quadratic speciﬁcation using 5-year cite stock as dependent variable
ever, moving closer to perfect competition, we attain an inverted-U relationship
between competition and innovations, which is better motivated by the escape from
competition and the Schumpeterian eects on innovation. We attain a similar two
peaked relationship using Gaussian kernel estimation with bandwidth 0.025, as seen
in Figure 11.
Finally, we also look at how the dispersion in within-industry technology levels
aects the rate of innovation. This was done by including our technology gap meas-
ure in the quadratic speciﬁcation. After controlling for technology gap, our results
on the inverted-U relationship become ambiguous. However, we ﬁnd that in three
out of four cases (i.e. when altering between our measures of proxy for innovation),
we get a negative sign for the technology gap measure, i.e.  in (5.6).T h en e g a t i v e
sign suggests that the smaller the technology gap, the higher the expected number
of patents, and hence the curve (whatever the shape) is shifted up. This is a rather
interesting result on its own, as it seems to point to the fact that industries with
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predicted number of events Median spline
Figure 10: Non-parametric estimation with splines and using the 5 year cite stock
as dependent variable
6.2 The complementarity between product market compet-
ition and R&D subsidies
The estimation results above were derived without speciﬁcally controlling for R&D
subsidies received by ﬁrms. In this section, we discuss the results of estimations
where we study the complementarity between competition and R&D subsidies.
This is done by including interaction terms in the conditional mean function, as
in (5.7)=Table 12 summarises the results. In columns 6 and 7, we present the coe!-
cients of estimations using the estimated lifetime citations discussed in section 3.1.3
as the dependent variable. Columns 8 and 9 in turn show the results of using the





Figure 11: Non-parametric kernel estimation using bandwidth 0.025 and Gaussian
weights
5-year cite stock as the dependent variable.
Interestingly, we can see that the inverted-U relationship between competition
and innovations is consistent regardless of the innovation measure, once relevant in-
teraction terms between the measure of competition and R&D subsidies are included
in the quadratic speciﬁcation of the model. However, the sign and signiﬁcance of
the coe!cients of interaction terms vary considerably. Using simple patent counts
and simple citation weights gives positive coe!cients for the ﬁrst order interaction
term and negative coe!cients for the relative R&D subsidy.
74Dependent variable:
SPC WPC Lifetime cit. 5-year FV
Observations 3174 3174 1420 886
Constant -5.60 20.90WW 7.32 46.75WW
s.e. (9=33) (5=74) (4=49) (4=59)
fmw 16.29 -30.07WW 1.71 -86.71WW
s.e. (20=92) (12=83) (10=07) (10=33)
f2
mw -11.67 10.29 -8.51 41.24WW
s.e. (11=75) (7=22) (5=67) (5=85)
QQmw -0.05 -0.64WW -0.79WW -1.73WW
s.e. (0=18) (0=12) (0=09) (0=08)
Industry eects yes yes yes yes
Time eects yes yes yes yes
Implication for an
inverted-U relationship - no - no








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































! This implies that the inverted-U relationship between competition and innov-
ation becomes steeper when the interaction between product market competition
and direct R&D subsidies is considered. However, the coe!cient of relative R&D
subsidies is negative, indicating that R&D subsidies tend on average to reduce the
probability of innovating. The ﬁnal eect depends on the degree of competition.
Given that at high and low levels of competition the rate of innovation is already
initially low, it is likely that the ﬁnal eect of a direct R&D subsidy will have a
negative eect on innovation. However, given that an R&D subsidy has a comple-
mentary role, at intermediate levels of competition the R&D subsidy is more likely
to have a desired positive eect on the average innovation rate of the economy, as
suggested in the theoretical model. When time and industry eects are included,
the interaction terms and the relative R&D subsidy are no longer signiﬁcant at the
95% signiﬁcance level. When using the impact corrected measures for innovation, we
attain contradicting results. The sign of the ﬁrst order interaction term is negative,
pointing to a reducing eect for the interaction term. This could be interpreted as
a sort of substitutability between competition and public aid to innovations.54
54In some theoretical studies, the substitutability between competition and credit constraints
with respect to innovations is discussed. See e.g. Aghion, Dewatripoint and Rey (1999).
777C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper contributes to the series of recent studies exploring the non-monotonous
relationship between innovation incentives and market structure. The aim of this
study has been to identify how the degree of product market competition aects in-
novative activity within industries and, on the aggregate level, of the economy. The
recent growth literature has paid increasing attention to the dynamic e!ciency gains
of competition. These e!ciency gains are broadly deﬁned in terms of productivity-
enhancing innovations. In particular, when a gradualist framework to technological
progress is adopted, as is done by Aghion et al. (1997, 2001), it can be analytically
shown that intensiﬁed product market competition between ﬁrms with equal tech-
nologies will increase each ﬁrm’s incentives to acquire a lead over its rival. In this
framework, product market competition has a central role in fostering innovation,
in the sense that intensiﬁed PMC may reduce pre-innovation rents by more than it
reduces post-innovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the incre-
mental proﬁts from innovating. On the other hand, competition may also reduce the
followers’ prospective gains from catching up with the leader. In a model by Aghion
et al. (1997, 2001), where the innovation process is assumed to be of a step-by-step
character, they derive an inverted-U relationship between competition and innov-
ation. This theoretical result deserves attention in the policy discussion of public
intervention in R&D activity, since it implies that the regulatory policy is closely
related to traditional R&D policy. However, the result should ﬁrst be conﬁrmed by
empirical studies, as is the case in Aghion et al. (2002). Their results suggest that
the prediction of an inverted-U relationship is found to accord well with observed
behavior.
In this paper, we confront the prediction made by Aghion et al. (1997, 2001)
with data on Finnish ﬁrms and extend the theoretical model of Aghion et al. (1997,
2001) by introducing R&D subsidies. In a simulation exercise we derive the result
78that the interplay of the incentive eects of intensiﬁed product market competition
and an R&D subsidy might be complementary in the sense that the R&D subsidy
only steepens the inverted-U shape at the aggregate level.
This suggests that, at extremely low and extremely high degrees of competition,
R&D subsidies may not have the desired eect of boosting innovative activity. An
important factor behind these results lies in the strategic substitutability eect,
which was shown to depend upon the degree of competition within an industry.
Turning our attention to our empirical results, we found relatively strong evid-
ence in favour of the inverted-U shape hypothesis in the Finnish data. Moreover,
we also ﬁnd some evidence of complementarity between competition and R&D sub-
sidies. Namely, our results suggest that the inverted-U relationship tends to be
steeper when R&D subsidies are also considered. The latter result can be inter-
preted to be in line with our theoretical result that additionality of R&D subsidies
depends upon the degree of competition. However, this result should be interpreted
with some caution, given that the direct eect of an R&D subsidy on our dierent
measures of innovation was found to be negative, indicating that the R&D subsidies
tend on average to reduce the probability of innovating.
A further ﬁnding is that industries with more dispersed technology levels tend to
innovate less compared with industries with more equal levels of technology between
the ﬁrms. This result is also in line with the model of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001),
which suggests that competition has a stronger impact on innovation for industries
that are closer in technology space.
If conﬁrmed by subsequent research, the results in our study indicate that the
level of competition within industries clearly has an impact on innovation incentives.
Implications that can be drawn from the results are that the within-industry product
market competition should be taken into consideration when designing public inter-
ventions to R&D activity. In particular, R&D subsidies may not be justiﬁable at all
79degrees of competition. Or at least, when deciding upon the distribution of R&D
subsidies, public authorities should opt for a selective R&D policy which takes into
account the within-industry market structure.
On the one hand, our theoretical results suggest that the highest additionality
would be achieved in industries with moderate levels of competition. On the other
hand, selective R&D subsidy schemes for middle-range productivity ﬁrms is a form
of public intervention that might foster innovations. In order to increase the compet-
itiveness of the industry, followers (i.e. companies lagging behind the leaders) should
be encouraged to challenge the leader and so raise the level of competition. This
form of subsidy should be directed at the middle-range productivity ﬁrms, while the
least productive ﬁrms are exposed to the selection eect. In other words, the risk of
subsidizing the least productive companies is very high, as they might be forced to
e x i tt h em a r k e ts o o n .T h u si tc a nb ea r g u e dt h a ti ti si r r e s p o n s i b l et ot a xp a y e r st o
subsidize the least e!cient ﬁrms in the market, as the return on investment is fairly
insecure. The selective R&D subsidy scheme can be criticized on the grounds that
it does not oer a juste retour to the leaders in the industry, who arguably still pay
t h el a r g e s tc o r p o r a t et a x e s .T h u si tw i l lb ed i !cult to legitimize such a policy.
A moderate version of the former public intervention is to encourage R&D joint
ventures between large and small companies. As R&D costs for developing successful
innovations are high and the time frames of the innovations are short, it has become
almost impossible for small entrants to compete with leaders in many industries.
Joint ventures is one solution for small ﬁrms to overcome the thresholds of critical
mass in many industries. For example, in the biotech industry, there are only a few
companies in the world that can cover the critical mass for developing a successful
concept. It is thus extremely important to lead companies together into research
consortia by publicly subsidized joint venture schemes. This goes especially for
small countries, where the absolute mass of research is limited. In Finland, Tekes
80has developed instruments especially designed to promote national and international
networking. The grants awarded to large companies are conditional to at least some
degree of networking or other type of cooperation with e.g. subcontractors. This
may importantly facilitate knowledge spillovers between the ﬁrms.
Finally, this study has opened up several interesting paths for further research
and extensions. First, the robustness of the results could be improved by controlling
for endogeneity of our competition measure. This can be done by considering policy
instruments that would provide exogenous variation in the degree of industry-wide
competition. A second interesting modiﬁcation would be to take a somewhat dif-
ferent approach to measuring innovation, by using survey data instead of patent
data. Also the possibility of combining patent data with existing innovation surveys
should be explored. Then survey data on the impact of the innovation could be used
to evaluate the value of the innovation for the company.
A third possible methodological extension would be to introduce into the analysis
alternative empirical applications of measuring competition, such as estimates of
relative proﬁt dierences (RPD), a competition measure introduced in a theoretical
paper by Boone (2004). The data needed to estimate RPD are the same as those
needed for constructing the Lerner index. Thus our plant level data set allows
us to estimate RPD. Another alternative measure for competition suggested by
Vives (2004) is the extent that each ﬁrm internalizes the proﬁts of other ﬁrms. If
ﬁrms are strongly interconnected with each other through cross-shareholdings, the
competitive pressure in the industry is assumed to be low.
Regarding extensions, it would be interesting to include in the analysis incentive
mechanisms related to ﬁnancial constraints and the capital structure of the ﬁrm.
Recent studies have shown that higher debt pressure might have a similar discip-
lining eect as competition, in the sense, that it induces ﬁrms to innovate more in
81order to escape debt pressure.55 Also the additionality of R&D subsidies for credit
constrained ﬁrms has been studied empirically by Toivanen and Niininen (2000),
who ﬁnd that the highest sensitivity to R&D subsidies occurs at moderate levels of
credit constraints. There is reason to believe that the ﬁnancial climate and the ad-
ditionality of R&D subsidies is closely related to the incentive eects of competition.
These interactions should be carefully explored in subsequent studies.
55See Aghion et al. (1999).
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87Appendices
A Weighting scheme
We follow Hall et al. (2000) in weighting the patents using the information on
citations that a patent has received from subsequent patents.56 In order to avoid
problems related to truncation bias, we calculate a "5 year cite stock", ﬁrst intro-
duced by Bloom and Van Reenen (2000). Let Fl>{ (w>v) be the number of citations
in year v to patent { of company l applied for in year w (v > w) at the USPTO.
The total number of citations received in year v by patents applied for in year w by





where Ql (w) is the number of patents by company l applied for in year w.F r o mt h i s





where W is the maximum time span in which the patent gets cited (in our case
W =5 ). We thus give every patent ﬁve years to receive citations. Since our data
runs up to 1999, we select our citation-weighting period to run up to 1994 in order
to have 5 years of observations on citations for every patent. Thus no truncation
bias correction is needed for this patent measure.
We set the depreciation rate for the “private value” of the patent at 30% and
denote the depreciation rate as . We only consider citations that occur during
the 5-year period of observation and depreciate the citations as of the date when
56See also Stavrevska and Tan (2003) for an exceptionally clear description of the citation weight-
ing method of Hall et al. (2003).
88they occur. Using the standard declining balance formula, our 5-year citation stock
measure is deﬁned by the following equation:
FV(w)=( 1  )FV(w  1) + F (w>w)
=( 1  )FV(w  1>w)+F(w>w)
+(1 )FV(w  2>w 1) + F (w  1>w)+
+(1 )FV(w  2>w 1) + (1  )
2 FV(w  3>w 2) + F(w  2>w)
+(1 )FV(w  3>w 1) + (1  )
2 FV(w  3>w 2)
+(1 )
3 FV(w  4>w 3) + F(w  3>w)
+(1 )FV(w  4>w 1) + (1  )
2 FV(w  4>w 2)
+(1 )
3 FV(w  4>w 3)
+(1 )
4 FV(w  5>w 4) + F(w  4>w)
+(1 )FV(w  5>w 1) + (1  )
2 FV(w  5>w 2)
+(1 )
3 FV(w  5>w 4)
+(1 )
4 FV(w  6>w 5) + F(w  5>w)
+=====
89The 5-year cite stock is deﬁned by the following equation:
FV(5) = (1  )FV(w  1) + F (w)
= F(0)
+(1  )FV(0) + F(1)
+(1  )FV(1) + (1  )
2FV(0) + F(2)
+(1  )FV(2) + (1  )
2FV(1) + (1  )
3FV(0) + F(3)
+(1  )FV(3) + (1  )
2FV(2) + (1  )
3FV(1) + (1  )
4FV(0)
+F(4) + (1  )FV(4) + (1  )
2FV(3) + (1  )
3FV(2)
+(1  )
4FV(1) + (1  )
5FV(0) + F(5)
B Semi-parametric methods
As our conjecture is that the relationship between product market competition and
innovation follows a nonlinear relationship, we wish to estimate the relationship
without imposing too much structure. Thus a useful nonparametric method for
investigating this relationship is a smoother. The advantage of a smoother is that
it does not assume too rigid a form for the dependence of \ on [1>====>[s=
B.1 Kernel estimator
We follow Aghion et al. (2002) in using a kernel smoother to estimate the rela-
tionship between product market competition and innovation in semi-parametric
fashion. A kernel smoother uses an explicitly deﬁned set of local weights, deﬁned
b yt h ek e r n e l ,t op r o d u c et h ee s t i m a t ea te a c ht a r g e tv a l u e . 57 Usually a kernel
smoother uses weights (e.g. Gaussian) that decrease smoothly as one moves away
from the target point. The weight given to the mth point in producing the estimate
57See Eubank, R. (1988) and Yatchew (1998), for a more detailed description of kernel smoothers.





µ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s0  sm

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¶
where g(w) is an even function decreasing in |w|= While the shape of the weights
is determined by g,t h ep a r a m e t e r controls the magnitude of the weights and is
normally referred to as the bandwidth. A large value of  results in greater weights
on observations that are far from s0=58 The constant h0 is usually chosen so that
the weights sum to unity. As mentioned, the standard Gaussian density can be
used for g. The Gaussian kernel smoother thus uses the Gaussian density function
to assign weights to neighboring points. Another popular kernel is the Epachnikov
kernel. More important than the choice of kernel, according to Yatchew (1998), is
the choice of the right bandwidth over which observations are averaged.














Although the exponential quadratic speciﬁcation of a Poisson model provides a reas-
onable approximation of the relationship, it is symmetric in its character. This does
not necessarily need to be the case, since we have highly overdispersed patent data
(i.e. excess amount of observations with zero patents) and a skewed distribution of
the Lerner index. The upward slope of the inverted-U shape is expected to be steeper
than the downward slope and hence the quadratic speciﬁcation is expected to be
systematically biased; the decrease in patenting activity appears to be slower than it
actually is. We use a regression spline, which is a less rigid form of parametric ﬁtting,
58Chosing a too large value of  will result in oversmoothing and selecting a too-small value
will cause the estimator to track the data too closely, decreasing the generality of the results. For
selecting the smoothing parameter a cross-validation method is proposed (Yatchew, 1998).
91Spline Basis Terms Parameters Properties
Linear
PQ
l=1 ({  Nl)>1>{ N+2 level equal at knots
Quadratic
PQ
l=1 ({  Nl)
2 >1>{>{ 2 N+3 level,1vw derivative equal at knots
Cubic
PQ
l=1 ({  Nl)
2 >1>{>{ 2>{ 3 N+4 level,1vw>2qg deriv. equal at knots
Quartic
PQ
l=1 ({  Nl)
2 >1>{>{ 2>{ 3>{ 4 N+5 level,1vw>2qg>3ug deriv. = at knots
Note: Knots are labelled N1>N 2>====>NQ
Table 13: Main properties of splines
to avoid this systematic bias. The regression spline gives a piecewise polynomial ﬁt.
As Eubank (1988) argues, a regression spline provides a good compromise between
the somewhat too global nature of the exponential mean speciﬁcation and the local
nature of the kernel estimator. The regions that deﬁne the pieces estimated are
separated by a sequence of evenly spaced knots (e.g. breakpoints) on the horizontal
axis. The piecewise polynomials are forced to join smoothly at these knots. The
advantage of the spline is that the parameters vary within the observation interval.
This allows for a more ﬂexible estimation and a hence a more precise ﬁt of the data.
The cost of the ﬂexibility is that the spline-curve is forced through the knots. We
use quadratic and cubic splines in our analysis. The main properties of the splines
are outlined in table (13). Using higher order splines ensures the derivatives are
equal across knots up to a higher order, at the cost of including an extra parameter.
The quadratic spline can be used in a Poisson model. The patent count process
is then written as
slw =e x p ( i (fmw)+{
0
lw) (B.2)
where i (fmw) is the spline function of competition and {0
lw the dummy set of time
and industry dummies.
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